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I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans value privacy.  Indeed, the notion that certain aspects of 
private life should be protected from government intrusion is 
incorporated into many provisions of the U.S. Constitution.  Other 
federal laws and many state laws also protect the privacy of individuals 
and groups.  Such rights as the freedom to practice one’s chosen religion, 
the freedom to raise children in the manner deemed best by parents, and 
the right to marry are all privacy rights that are firmly established in the 
United States.  However, these privacy rights are not absolute.  Laws 
protecting children and other vulnerable individuals from abuse and 
neglect may trump privacy rights.  But laws protecting the privacy of 
individuals or groups can make it difficult for government officials to 
enforce laws designed to protect those at risk. 
These problems have been studied in the context of violence against 
women and children, although the focus has largely been on the status of 
children or the public versus private nature of family relationships.1  In 
contrast, this Article will identify laws that protect the privacy of 
individuals and groups (particularly families) as well as the laws 
designed to protect the health, dignity, and well-being of individuals.  
                                                     
 *  Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  B.A., Duke University 1993; J.D., Duke 
University 1997.  The author thanks Alicia Seibel for her valuable research and drafting assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF 
PRIVATE VIOLENCE 3 (1994) (“Feminist activists and legal practitioners have . . . developed legal 
definitions of private violence that better reflected women’s experiences, pursued the prosecution 
and punishment of violent men, and helped women to empower themselves.”); Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974 (1990) (“This essay explores the 
ways in which concepts of privacy permit, encourage, and reinforce violence against women, 
focusing on the complex interrelationship between notations of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in our social 
understandings of woman-abuse.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private 
Family: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and 
Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 393 (1996) (“address[ing] children’s needs for responsible 
parenting and the continuing struggle to reach an appropriate balance between public and private 
roles in meeting these basic needs and in preparing children for citizenship”). 
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This Article will then examine how the enforcement of privacy laws can 
deprive individuals of the protection of other laws, including laws that 
guarantee individual rights and freedoms. 
These issues will be viewed through the lens of the controversial 
case of the children taken into state custody from the Yearning for Zion 
Ranch (“YFZ Ranch” or “the Ranch”) in Texas.  Specifically, the Article 
will examine the allegations that led government authorities to intervene 
and remove the children from the Ranch and the court battle that resulted 
in the return of all but one child to their families.  The Article will then 
explore the difficulties the government faces when such allegations are 
made against citizens of isolated communities who have little interaction 
with the larger American society.  This Article will further demonstrate 
how privacy laws—originating in the U.S. Constitution, state 
constitutions, federal and state statutes, and common law doctrines—
work together to make it possible for people to abuse or otherwise 
oppress others who are under their control or influence. 
This Article is not intended as a judgment or condemnation of the 
YFZ residents or the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints (“FLDS Church”), nor is it a judgment of the guilt or 
innocence of any of those involved in the YFZ case.  Indeed, in many 
respects, the YFZ Ranch is similar to every individual household in the 
United States.  Every household enjoys a degree of privacy that cannot 
be intruded upon by the government absent extraordinary circumstances.  
However, the Ranch provides a degree of privacy that is not present for 
most people in larger, particularly urban, communities.  The Ranch 
provides physical isolation of an entire, largely self-contained, multi-
generational community.  These unique features, in addition to the real 
conflict that arose when state officials took custody of hundreds of 
children that they believed were in danger of abuse at the YFZ Ranch, 
make it a useful vehicle for exploring the issues of privacy, freedom, and 
the potential for oppression. 
Part II of this Article describes the YFZ Ranch and the events 
leading up to and following government officials’ decision to remove 
hundreds of children from the Ranch and place them in state custody.  
Part III identifies provisions of the U.S. Constitution that protect privacy, 
particularly in the context of families and religious beliefs and practices.  
Part III also discusses the limits on the privacy rights conferred by 
various constitutional provisions.  Part IV examines privacy rights 
conferred by state constitutions, statutes, and common law doctrines, as 
well as circumstances in which state interests override privacy rights.  
Part V reviews a bill introduced in the United States Senate to establish a 
federal polygamy task force and summarizes testimony at a Senate 
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Hearing on crimes associated with polygamy.  Part VI then describes 
how laws protecting privacy of all individuals can lead to the oppression 
of some vulnerable groups or individuals.  Finally, Part VII explores 
ways in which government officials can prevent oppression and abuse 
without violating privacy rights, including regulating home schooling 
and establishing community outreach programs. 
II. YEARNING FOR ZION RANCH 
A. Yearning for Zion and the FLDS Church Background 
The Yearning for Zion Ranch is a 1700 acre property located near 
the town of Eldorado in Schleicher County, Texas.2  A number of 
families associated with the FLDS Church live on the Ranch.3  The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (also known as the Mormon 
Church) previously embraced polygamy, but the practice was banned by 
the Church in 1890.4  The FLDS Church—which separated from The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the early twentieth 
century—still practices and advocates polygamy, even though it is illegal 
in all fifty states.5  Residents of the YFZ Ranch share these beliefs and 
allegedly practice polygamy, with men entering into “spiritual” 
marriages with multiple women.6  Young girls are alleged to have been 
“married” to adult (often much older) men when the girls are under the 
age of sixteen, the youngest age at which minors can be married in Texas 
without a court order.7  Moreover, girls as young as thirteen are alleged 
to have been impregnated by their “spiritual husbands.”8 
B. Government Removal of Yearning for Zion Children and Subsequent 
Court Orders 
In late March 2008, the Texas Department of Family and Protective 
Services (DFS) received a telephone call from a girl named Sarah who 
                                                     
 2. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613 (Tex. 2008). 
 3. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008) (per 
curiam). 
 4. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 5. CAROLYN JESSOP & LAURA PALMER, ESCAPE 18 (2007). 
 6. Because polygamy is illegal, the men cannot enter into more than one legal marriage.  In re 
Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 613. 
 7. Id. at 616 (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 8. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 n.5. 
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claimed that she was being physically and sexually abused at the Ranch.9  
DFS investigators and law enforcement officials entered the Ranch 
several days later in early April 2008.10  They interviewed adults and 
children and, without a court order, ultimately took possession of all of 
the girls and boys present at the Ranch—approximately 468 children.11 
Under Texas law, DFS officials are allowed to take children into 
custody on an emergency basis if “the circumstances indicate a danger to 
the physical health and welfare of the children and the need for 
protection of the children is so urgent that immediate removal of the 
children from the home is necessary.”12  DFS claimed that such a danger 
existed based upon the following evidence: 
• Interviews with investigators revealed a pattern of girls 
reporting that “there was no age too young for girls to be 
married”; 
• Twenty females living at the ranch had become pregnant 
between the ages of thirteen and seventeen; 
• Five of the twenty females identified as having become 
pregnant between the ages of thirteen and seventeen [were] 
alleged to be minors, the other fifteen are now adults; 
• Of the five minors who became pregnant, four [were] 
seventeen, and one [was] sixteen, and all five [were] alleged to 
have become pregnant at the age of fifteen or sixteen; 
• The Department’s lead investigator was of the opinion that 
due to the “pervasive belief system” of the FLDS, the male 
children are groomed to be perpetrators of sexual abuse and 
the girls are raised to be victims of sexual abuse.13 
According to DFS, the children were removed from the Ranch “under the 
theory that the ranch community was ‘essentially one household 
comprised of extended family subgroups’ with a single, common belief 
system and there was reason to believe that a child had been sexually 
abused in the ranch ‘household.’”14 
                                                     
 9. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 613. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 613–14.  Sarah was never found.  Id. at 614. 
 12. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1. 
 13. Id. at **1–2.  Additionally, “[o]ne woman [was] alleged to have become pregnant at the age 
of thirteen.”  Id. at *2 n.5. 
 14. Id. at *2. 
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DFS filed suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCRs) and 
after an adversary hearing the district court issued temporary orders 
continuing DFS’s custody of the children.15  Thirty-eight mothers filed 
petitions for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals seeking to have 
the district court’s order vacated and their 126 children returned.16  The 
court of appeals found that the evidence presented at the district court 
hearing was “legally and factually insufficient to support the findings 
required” by Texas Family Code section 262.201 to allow DFS to 
maintain custody of the children.17  Because DFS failed to meet its 
burden of proof under the statute, the court of appeals directed the 
district court to vacate its orders granting sole managing conservatorship 
to DFS.18 
DFS then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme 
Court.19  The court denied the petition, saying “[h]aving carefully 
examined the . . . evidence before us, we are not inclined to disturb the 
court of appeals’ decision.  On the record before us, removal of the 
children was not warranted.”20  While the opinion was unanimous with 
respect to the male and prepubescent female children, several justices 
dissented from the opinion to the extent that it ordered the return of the 
pubescent female children.21 
The dissenting justices found that the evidence was sufficient to 
satisfy the standard of section 262.201 that pubescent girls were at risk of 
sexual abuse.22  In particular, the expert witness called by the children’s 
families testified that “the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints accepts the age of ‘physical development’ (that is, first 
menstruation) as the age of eligibility for ‘marriage.’”23  Additionally, a 
child psychologist testified that “the pregnancy of the underage children 
on the Ranch was the result of sexual abuse because children of the age 
of fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen are not sufficiently emotionally mature to 
enter a healthy consensual sexual relationship or a ‘marriage.’”24 
The dissenting opinion further pointed out that efforts to enable the 
children to return home—by seeking restraining orders against the 
                                                     
 15. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 614–15. 
 16. Id. at 615. 
 17. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4. 
 18. Id. 
 19. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 616–17 (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 616. 
 24. Id. 
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alleged perpetrators of the abuse—were thwarted by the mothers and 
children: 
When the Department arrived at the YFZ Ranch, it was treated 
cordially and allowed access to children, but those children repeatedly 
pled “the Fifth” in response to questions about their identity, would not 
identify their birth-dates or parentage, refused to answer questions 
about who lived in their homes, and lied about their names—sometimes 
several times.  Answers from parents were similarly inconsistent: one 
mother first claimed that four children were hers, and then later avowed 
that they were not.  Furthermore, the Department arrived to discover 
that a shredder had been used to destroy documents just before its 
arrival.25 
Based on the evidence relating to pubescent girls, the dissent would have 
granted DFS’s petition for mandamus.26 
C. Yearning for Zion Residents’ Response 
It is important to note that the YFZ residents have disputed the 
allegations of sexual abuse, and in interviews after the raid, many 
residents denied any knowledge of sexual abuse or underage girls being 
married to older men.27  Moreover, the residents characterize their living 
arrangement as beneficial to the women and children of the families, 
with several women living with one man and the children of all of the 
women being raised together in a loving, supportive environment.28 
Several women may be “married” to the same man, but the women insist 
that they have no objection to the arrangement.29  The women view 
themselves as mother to all of the children in the household and consider 
jealousy to be a sin or weakness that they must overcome in order to be 
like God.30  The children do not spend time in meaningless pursuits such 
as “play time,” nor are fairy tales read to the children.31  Instead, the 
children work alongside the adults to grow food and maintain the 
households and community.32  Food is shared among all households and 
                                                     
 25. Id. at 617–18. 
 26. Id. at 618. 
 27. The Oprah Winfrey Show: Oprah Goes Inside the Yearning for Zion Polygamist Ranch 
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2009). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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goods are available to all in need at no cost.33  Daily worship is also an 
integral part of everyday life.34 
The residents view the Ranch as a safe environment where everyone 
works and strives to be like Christ.35  In their view, being removed from 
the violence and corruption of the larger society protects the women and 
children instead of harming or oppressing them.36  The raid by 
government officials and the emotional devastation that resulted for the 
families seemed to reinforce the view among residents that the 
government causes harm instead of preventing it.37  One woman who 
was taken from the Ranch when she was fourteen—because her mother 
feared the girl was about to be married to an older man—returned to the 
Ranch shortly after her eighteenth birthday, preferring the life on the 
Ranch to the outside world.38 
III. PRIVACY RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Privacy rights are protected by a variety of sources, with the U.S. 
Constitution being the preeminent source.  While the Constitution does 
not refer explicitly to privacy, several provisions, including the First, 
Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, have been interpreted as 
protecting privacy rights in various degrees and contexts. 
A. First Amendment Protection 
1. Free Exercise Clause 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in part: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”39  These provisions, also 
known as the “Free Exercise Clause” and the “Establishment Clause,” 
prevent the government from regulating religious beliefs or doctrines.40  
Thus, the government may neither compel nor punish particular religious 
                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  The woman, named Betty Jessop, is the daughter of Carolyn Jessop, co-author of 
ESCAPE.  See supra note 5.  Carolyn Jessop’s Senate testimony criticizing the FLDS Church is 
discussed infra Part V.B. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 40. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990). 
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doctrine.41  Nor may it impose burdens on specific religious groups on 
the basis of their beliefs.42 
The state may only intrude upon or limit religious liberty if “it is 
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”43  
Consequently, religious beliefs will be accommodated by the 
government unless restriction is necessary for the common good.44  In 
the past, the government has accommodated, among many others, a 
religious group who refused to send their children to school because it 
violated their religious beliefs,45 a group who employed animal sacrifice 
as part of their religious ceremonies,46 and a student whose religious 
beliefs were violated by a requirement that she utter certain words as part 
of assignments in a state university’s theater program.47  In each case, 
courts found no government interest sufficiently compelling to overcome 
the right to free exercise of religion.48 
In the landmark case of Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court noted that in prior 
decisions it had applied a balancing test when parties sought exemption 
from generally applicable laws.49  Under that test, “governmental actions 
that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest.”50  However, in Smith, the Court 
changed its position and concluded that the test is inapplicable to such 
challenges.51  “The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable 
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other  
 
                                                     
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 877.  “The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the 
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disabilities on the basis of 
religious views or religious status, or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over 
religious authority or dogma.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 43. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982).  This standard has become known as 
the strict scrutiny test.  See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general 
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. . . .  A law that targets religious conduct for 
distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a 
religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”). 
 44. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259. 
 45. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 236 (1972) (members of Amish religion). 
 46. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 524 (members of Santeria religion). 
 47. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280–81 (10th Cir. 2004) (member of The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints). 
 48. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34; Axson-
Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295. 
 49. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 885. 
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aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a 
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”52 
Congress responded to this decision by passing the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).53  The Act states that 
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except as provided in subsection (b).”54  The exceptions allow the burden 
if it “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest,” and (2) 
the government has employed the least restrictive means of furthering 
that interest.55  Thus, Congress sought to reinstate the compelling interest 
test that the Supreme Court rejected in Smith.56 
Congress’s effort was only partially successful.  In City of Boerne v. 
Flores, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA, at least 
insofar as it applied to the states.57  The statute—and the compelling 
interest test included therein—remains effective and binding on the 
federal government.58  Consequently, a generally applicable law that 
burdens the free exercise of religion does not violate the First 
Amendment, but if it is a federal law, it may violate RFRA.  The 
residents of the YFZ Ranch, therefore, cannot rely on the Free Exercise 
Clause to exempt them from generally applicable state laws even if those 
laws conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs.59 
2. Freedom of Intimate Association and Freedom of Expressive 
Association 
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of association in two different 
                                                     
 52. Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 54. Id. § 2000bb-1(a). 
 55. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 56. Id. § 2000bb(a). 
 57. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).  “Broad as the power of Congress is 
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles 
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”  Id. 
 58. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006) 
(applying RFRA to case challenging the federal Controlled Substances Act which members of a 
religious sect claimed burdened the exercise of their religion). 
 59. They may, however, rely on a state law that is substantially similar to RFRA that was 
passed in 1999.  See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (Vernon 2005); see 
discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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contexts.60  First, “the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and 
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against 
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in 
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional 
scheme.”61  This has been termed “freedom of intimate association.”62  
The Court has not attempted to define precisely which relationships 
receive this constitutional protection, but it has noted that “certain kinds 
of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions 
of the Nation,”63 and those relationships reflect “the realization that 
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties 
with others.”64 
Still, not every personal relationship is protected.  Affiliations that 
have been recognized as worthy of constitutional protection include 
those involved in the creation and sustenance of a family or marriage, the 
raising and education of children, and cohabitation with relatives.65  The 
Court noted that these family relationships are distinguished by “relative 
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain 
the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the 
relationship.”66  The Court concluded that only relationships with similar 
qualities are likely to be protected by the freedom of intimate association 
guarantee of the First Amendment.67 
The second category of freedom of association is called “freedom of 
expressive association.”68  This kind of association refers to “a right to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the 
First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of 
grievances, and the exercise of religion.”69  The “right to associate with 
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends” is implicit in the right to engage 
in activities protected by the First Amendment.70 
                                                     
 60. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984). 
 61. Id. at 617–18. 
 62. Id. at 618. 
 63. Id. at 618–19. 
 64. Id. at 619. 
 65. Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–86 (1977); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 
816, 844 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977)). 
 66. Id. at 620. 
 67. Id.  In the Jaycees case, the Court held that membership in the Jaycees was not within the 
category of relationships protected by the Constitution.  Id. at 620–21. 
 68. Id. at 618. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 622. 
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Neither the freedom of intimate association nor the freedom of 
expressive association is absolute.  However, because both are 
fundamental rights,71 government interference is subject to strict 
scrutiny.72  A party’s freedom of association may only be infringed upon 
if justified by a compelling state interest.73  Moreover, the state must 
show that the interest cannot be achieved through significantly less 
restrictive means.74 
With respect to the YFZ residents, the freedom of intimate 
association certainly applies to their family relationships, marriages, the 
desire to raise and educate their children consistent with their religious 
beliefs, and the choice to live with other family members.  Additionally, 
the YFZ residents have a protected right of expressive association to the 
extent that they associate for the purpose of engaging in activities 
protected by the First Amendment.  In particular, they have a right to 
associate for the purpose of exercising their religion and pursuing social 
and educational goals.  Living together in a community, worshiping 
together, and educating their children in religious schools are all 
protected forms of expressive association.  The State of Texas cannot 
infringe upon these rights unless justified by a compelling state interest 
that cannot be achieved through less restrictive means. 
B. Limits on First Amendment Protection 
1. Freedom of Religion and Family Privacy Yield to the Interest in 
Protecting Minors from Abuse and Neglect 
While the U.S. Constitution guarantees parents a great deal of 
latitude in determining how to raise their children, their rights are 
somewhat limited when the child’s physical health is at issue.  While the 
Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the rights of parents to refuse 
potentially life-saving treatment for their children if the treatment 
violates the parents’ or children’s religious beliefs, state and lower 
federal courts facing the issue have held that court orders authorizing 
                                                     
 71. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1498 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 72. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 73. Id.; see also La. Debating & Literary Ass’n, 42 F.3d at 1498 (noting that freedom of 
intimate association is also subject to strict scrutiny which requires the government to show a 
compelling interest that “cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of one’s 
associational freedom”). 
 74. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.  In the Jaycees case, the Court held that Minnesota had a 
compelling interest in eradicating gender-based discrimination and that the interest justified 
infringement on the Jaycees’ freedom of expressive association.  Id. at 623–25. 
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treatment over the parents’ objections do not violate the parents’ 
constitutional rights.75 
In Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1, a class 
consisting of adult and minor members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (an 
unincorporated religious association) and their governing agency argued 
that provisions of the Washington Juvenile Court Law were 
unconstitutional as applied to them.76  The plaintiffs’ religious beliefs 
prohibited receiving blood transfusions.77  The provisions at issue 
defined “dependent child” to include a child “who is grossly and wilfully 
neglected as to medical care necessary for his well-being.”78  The 
Juvenile Court was authorized under a separate provision to enter orders 
for the care of any such dependent child.79  The plaintiffs’ complaint 
alleged that the defendant physicians, hospitals, superior court judges, 
and juvenile court employees invoked these provisions to obtain court 
orders to remove minor children of Jehovah’s Witnesses from their 
parents’ custody when the parents refused to give consent for blood 
transfusions for the children.80  The children become wards of the court, 
and the court then authorizes the blood transfusions over the parents’ 
objections.81 
The plaintiffs alleged that the application of the Juvenile Court Law 
under such circumstances violated their constitutional rights.82  
Specifically, they alleged violation of their First Amendment rights to 
freedom of association, free exercise of religion, and the Establishment 
Clause; denial of life, liberty, and property without due process of law in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment; denial of their right to family privacy 
in violation of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments; and denial of the 
                                                     
 75. See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488, 505 
(W.D. Wash. 1967) (“‘Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves.  But it does not follow 
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.’” (quoting Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944))), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); O.G. v. Baum, 790 
S.W.2d 839, 840–41 (Tex. App. 1990) (“The parents’ first and fourteenth amendment guarantee of 
religious freedom does not include the liberty to expose their child to ill health or death.”). 
 76. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 499. 
 77. Id. at 502.  “Plaintiffs believe and accept as authoritative and binding upon them the 
admonition of Almighty God Jehovah found in the Holy Bible commanding Christians to ‘abstain 
from blood.’”  Id.  The plaintiffs also believed that blood transfusions were risky, of limited or no 
medical value, and that alternative means of treatment were always available that made transfusions 
unnecessary and unadvisable.  Id. at 503. 
 78. Id. at 498 n.1 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(12)). 
 79. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.095). 
 80. Id. at 500. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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equal protection of the laws.83  The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the 
disputed provisions were unconstitutional and invalid as applied to them 
and sought to enjoin state judges and other government agents from 
declaring children of plaintiffs or members of the plaintiff class to be 
wards of the state under those provisions solely based on the parents’ 
refusal to authorize blood transfusions on religious or medical grounds.84 
The district court believed that the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in Prince v. Massachusetts was applicable to Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.85  While acknowledging that the Supreme Court did not 
intend for the holding in Prince to be extended beyond its facts, the 
district court nevertheless believed that “it does lay the foundation, 
binding upon us, for the particular state intervention in the name of 
health and welfare which is here under review.”86  In particular, the 
district court referenced the following language in Prince: “The right to 
practice religion freely does not include liberty [to] expose . . . the 
child . . . to ill health or death.”87  In accordance with Prince, the district 
court held that the Juvenile Court Code was not invalid under the U.S. 
Constitution.88  The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a one line 
per curiam opinion citing Prince.89 
In Texas, courts have relied on the Family Code’s sections that 
authorize government action to protect minors’ health and safety when 
granting government officers or entities temporary custody of minors 
whose parents refuse to allow necessary medical treatment.90  In O.G. v. 
Baum, a sixteen-year-old minor had been seriously injured when he was 
hit by a train and needed surgery to try to save his right arm.91  In a 
sworn statement presented to the trial court, the minor’s doctor stated 
that a blood transfusion might be necessary during the course of the 
                                                     
 83. Id. at 500–01. 
 84. Id. at 501. 
 85. Id. at 504. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944)). 
 88. Id. at 505.  The district court further noted that both the Illinois Supreme Court and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court had similarly interpreted Prince in cases involving blood transfusions for 
minor children of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Id. 
 89. Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598, 598 (1968) (per 
curiam). 
 90. See O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. App. 1990).  At the time of that decision, 
Chapter 17 of the Family Code authorized appointment of a temporary managing conservator of the 
minor.  See id.  That chapter was repealed and the relevant provisions are now contained in Chapter 
262 of the Family Code.  See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.110 (2008). 
 91. Baum, 790 S.W.2d at 840. 
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surgery.92  The minor’s parents refused to allow the transfusion and the 
minor signed a statement purporting to release the hospital and 
physicians from any liability to him as a result of not giving the 
transfusion.93  Child Protective Services (CPS) filed suit and was 
appointed temporary managing conservator for the minor.94  The sole 
ground for the appointment was the parents’ refusal to allow the 
transfusion.95  The parents filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing 
that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the temporary 
conservatorship order because the order infringed upon the free exercise 
of their religion and their right to privacy as guaranteed by the U.S. and 
Texas constitutions and Texas common law.96 
The court of appeals also cited Prince’s statement limiting parents’ 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when their children’s lives are at 
stake.97  The court then noted that other courts addressing the 
constitutionality of court orders consenting to blood transfusions over the 
parents’ religious objections have held that such orders do not violate the 
parents’ constitutional rights.98  Moreover, no contrary authority with 
respect to the U.S. Constitution, Texas Constitution, or Texas common 
law was cited by the parents.99  Consequently, the court of appeals held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing CPS 
temporary managing conservator of the minor.100 
While there were no allegations that the YFZ parents neglected to 
provide necessary medical care to their children, it is worth noting that 
the Texas authorities would be justified in taking custody of the children 
on the Ranch if there was evidence that medically necessary treatment 
was being withheld on religious grounds.  Indeed, such allegations have 
been made by a former member of another FLDS Church community.101 
                                                     
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944)). 
 98. Id. at 841 (citing Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488, 
505 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Staelens v. Yake, 432 F. Supp. 834, 839 (N.D. 
Ill. 1977)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5, at 230 (“[Warren Jeffs] began preaching that anyone who 
needed medical help to heal was a person of little faith.  A person in harmony with God could heal 
him- or herself with fasting and prayer.  Before I saw this play out in our own home, I knew of 
several people who nearly died and children who became severely ill before they were taken to the 
hospital as a last resort.”). 
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2. Laws Advancing Compelling State Interests May Justify 
Infringement on Freedom of Association 
States can enforce laws that infringe on freedom of association if the 
infringement is justified by a compelling state interest, is unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas, and the interest cannot be achieved through 
significantly less restrictive means.102  In Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, the national Jaycees organization alleged that the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act violated its members’ freedom of association rights 
because the Act required the admission of women as members of its 
Minnesota chapters.103  The Court was persuaded that Minnesota had a 
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female 
citizens and ensuring equal access to publicly available goods and 
services.104  Moreover, the State sought to advance these interests 
through the least restrictive means.105  “[E]ven if enforcement of the Act 
causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that 
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate 
purposes.”106 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court addressed a First Amendment 
challenge to a federal law that imposed reporting and disclosure 
requirements on political parties.107  The Court found compelling 
governmental interests in: providing information about who has 
contributed to a candidate’s campaign and how that money was spent;108 
avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption by publicizing 
large contributions and expenditures;109 and gathering information 
necessary to identify violations of contribution limits.110  The parties 
challenging the disclosure laws conceded, and the Court agreed, “that 
disclosure requirements—certainly in most applications—appear to be 
the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance 
and corruption that Congress found to exist.”111  However, the Court 
found a diminished state interest in the disclosure of contributions made 
                                                     
 102. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
 103. Id. at 615. 
 104. Id. at 623. 
 105. Id. at 626. 
 106. Id. at 628. 
 107. 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976) (per curiam). 
 108. Id. at 66–67. 
 109. Id. at 67. 
 110. Id. at 67–68. 
 111. Id. at 68. 
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to minor candidates with little chance of winning an election.112  On the 
record in that case, the Court found that “the substantial public interest in 
disclosure identified by the legislative history of this Act outweighs the 
harm generally alleged.”113 
Likewise, in United States v. Lee, the Court held that an Amish 
employer was not exempt from paying social security taxes even though 
the payment of such taxes violated his religious beliefs.114  The Court 
found that the governmental interest in the social security system was 
apparent in the variety of benefits available to all participants.115  The 
system relies upon mandatory participation by employers and employees 
in order to remain viable.116  “[T]he Government’s interest in assuring 
mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social 
security system is very high.”117  Moreover, accommodating the religious 
beliefs of individuals would be untenable:118 
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to 
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner 
that violates their religious belief.  Because the broad public interest in 
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief 
in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the 
tax.119 
Congress had already provided an exemption for self-employed Amish 
and others whose religious beliefs forbade payment of social security 
taxes and the Court noted that this exemption demonstrated Congress’s 
sensitivity to the rights afforded by the Free Exercise Clause and the 
religious beliefs of individuals.120  However, it noted that the exemption 
was limited to self-employed individuals, which created a narrow group 
of readily identifiable persons to whom the exemption would apply.121  
                                                     
 112. Id. at 70. 
 113. Id. at 72. 
 114. 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). 
 115. Id. at 258. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 258–59. 
 118. Id. at 259. 
 119. Id. at 260 (citations omitted). 
 120. Id. at 260–61.  Congress provided an exemption from the social security tax for self-
employed members of religious groups whose beliefs were violated by such payments if the 
individual met certain criteria, including a waiver of his or her right to all social security benefits and 
proof that the religious group made sufficient provision for its dependent members.  Id. at 255–56 
(citing 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)).  However, the defendant in Lee employed several other employees and, 
therefore, he did not qualify for the exemption.  Id. at 256. 
 121. Id. at 260. 
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Expanding the exemption to include employers would not only broaden 
the scope of the exemption tremendously, it would also impose the 
employer’s religious beliefs on the employees.122  Consequently, the tax 
was held to be constitutional as applied to Lee.123 
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Protection and Its 
Limits 
1. Substantive Due Process Protects Against Undue Regulation of 
Families and Intimate Relationships 
While the state has the authority to regulate in ways that affect 
families,124 the Supreme Court has consistently protected “the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”125  The Court has 
described the policy behind such protection: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes 
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.126 
Over the last hundred years, the Court has held that the Due Process 
Clause protects the right to make decisions relating to marriage,127 
procreation,128 contraception,129 child rearing and education, 130 and the 
right of adults to engage in consensual sexual acts  in private.131 
Of particular relevance to the YFZ case is parents’ right to send their 
children to private or religious schools for their education.  In Pierce v. 
Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, private and 
                                                     
 122. Id. at 261. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (“Of course, the family is 
not beyond regulation.”). 
 125. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 126. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 127. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
 129. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 130. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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religious schools filed suit to challenge Oregon’s Compulsory Education 
Act, which required parents to send all children between the ages of eight 
and sixteen to public schools.132  The plaintiffs alleged that the Act 
violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.133  The Supreme Court did 
not question the state’s power to regulate, supervise, inspect, and 
examine schools, teachers, and students; to require that all children of a 
certain age attend some school; or to require certain subjects be taught.134  
However, the Court believed that the Act “unreasonably interferes with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”135 
This right has been extended in many states to allow parents to teach 
their children at home instead of sending their children to public or 
private schools.  In Texas, home schools are recognized as a type of 
private school, which is expressly allowed under the state compulsory 
education law.136  Thus, under Texas law, the YFZ parents have the right 
to home school their children.137 
This privacy interest also limits the degree to which the state can 
prevent extended families from living together.  In Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, the Court held that a city ordinance that prohibited 
certain members of an extended family from living in the same 
household violated the parties’ substantive due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.138  In that case, Moore was convicted of 
violating a city housing ordinance when she allowed her grandson to 
move into her home.139  Moore’s son and grandson (uncle and cousin to 
the second grandson) were already living with her at the time.140  Under 
the ordinance, occupancy of the house was limited to a single family.141  
The term “family” was defined in a way that did not encompass the 
arrangement in Moore’s household.142 
The city claimed that the Court’s decision in Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas143 was controlling.144  In Belle Terre, the Court upheld an 
                                                     
 132. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 529–32. 
 133. Id. at 533. 
 134. Id. at 534. 
 135. Id. at 534–35. 
 136. Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 443–44 (Tex. 1994). 
 137. See id. 
 138. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977). 
 139. Id. at 496–97. 
 140. Id. at 496. 
 141. Id. at 495–96. 
 142. Id. at 496 n.2. 
 143. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
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ordinance restricting land use to single family dwellings.145  “Family” 
was defined to mean “one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or 
marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, 
exclusive of household servants.”146  The plaintiffs were owners of a 
house that they leased to six unrelated students attending a nearby 
university.147  The plaintiffs were charged with violating the ordinance 
and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of their 
constitutional rights.148  The district court upheld the ordinance and the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.149  The Supreme Court held 
that there was no constitutional violation.150  First, the Court found that 
no fundamental right such as voting, right of association, or right of 
privacy was involved.151  Next, it noted that when legislating with respect 
to social or economic issues, no equal protection violation will be found 
if the law is reasonable, not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to 
a legitimate state objective.152  Because the ordinance met that test, it did 
not infringe on the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.153 
The city of East Cleveland argued that the ordinance under which 
Moore was convicted should be upheld on the same grounds as those in 
Belle Terre.154  The Supreme Court disagreed.155  The Court believed that 
“one overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre.  The 
ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals.”156  Because the East 
Cleveland ordinance sought to regulate families, Belle Terre did not 
control.157 
The Court acknowledged that housing ordinances may be a valid 
means of advancing legitimate governmental interests, but noted that the  
 
                                                                                                                       
 144. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498. 
 145. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8–9.  The ordinance excluded “lodging houses, boarding houses, 
fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses.”  Id. at 2. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 2–3. 
 148. Id. at 3. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 7–9. 
 151. Id. at 7. 
 152. Id. at 8. 
 153. See id. at 8–9. 
 154. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977). 
 155. Id. at 498–99. 
 156. Id. at 498. 
 157. Id. at 498–99. 
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Court has previously held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects freedom of personal choice in matters of family 
life.158  Although prior cases recognizing a due process right did not deal 
with housing choices or with rights for family members beyond the 
nuclear family, the Court noted that there is no precise formula for 
determining when the Due Process Clause applies and provides 
protection.159  Moreover, the family was recognized as an institution that 
is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”160 and that 
tradition has not been limited to nuclear families.161  Consequently, the 
Due Process Clause applied and protected the Moore family.162  The 
Court held that the ordinance in question had only a tenuous relation to 
the stated goals of controlling traffic and parking congestion and limiting 
the burden on the public school system.163  These objectives did not 
justify the burden on the Moore family, and the ordinance was held to be 
unconstitutional.164 
The YFZ residents allegedly include several households with 
interrelated and extended families.165  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of those families and their 
choice to live together in the same household and would limit the State 
of Texas’s ability to regulate or alter the families’ living arrangements by 
passing housing or other zoning ordinances. 
2. Limits on Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
a. Laws Prohibiting Sexual Conduct with Minors Do Not Violate 
Constitutional Rights 
While the right of adults to engage in private sexual conduct is 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,166 no 
such right exists if adults seek to engage in sexual conduct with minors.   
 
                                                     
 158. Id. at 499. 
 159. Id. at 501. 
 160. Id. at 503. 
 161. Id. at 504. 
 162. Id. at 505–06. 
 163. Id. at 500. 
 164. Id. at 506. 
 165. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008) (per 
curiam). 
 166. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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According to section 21.11 of the Texas Penal Code, “[a] person 
commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years of age, 
whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, the person engages in 
sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual 
contact.”167  While this section only makes sexual contact a crime if the 
victim is not the perpetrator’s spouse,168 in Texas a person must be 
sixteen years old in order to marry.169  Persons over sixteen but less than 
eighteen years of age must have parental consent in order to get 
married.170  It is a third degree felony for a person to “knowingly 
provide[] parental consent . . . for an applicant who is younger than 16 
years of age or who is presently married to a person other than the person 
the applicant desires to marry.”171  Finally, while common law or 
“informal” marriages are recognized in Texas,172 persons under eighteen 
years of age may not be a party to an informal marriage.173 
Among other accusations, adult male residents of the YFZ Ranch 
were alleged to have impregnated girls under the age of sixteen.174  Such 
sexual contact with the girls would qualify as indecency with a child, 
even if the contact was consensual.175  The accused men might try to 
argue that they are not guilty of any crime because they were married to 
the girls.176  However, because Texas law prohibits marriage of girls that 
young, any “marriage” involving the girls would be void.  Consequently, 
the exception for spouses would be inapplicable. 
                                                     
 167. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 2003).  The section includes an affirmative 
defense for actors not more than three years older than the victim, who do not use duress, force, or a 
threat against the victim, who are not required to register as sex offenders, and have not had a 
reportable conviction or adjudication under this section.  Id. § 21.11(b). 
 168. Id. § 21.11(b-1). 
 169. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 2006). 
 170. Id. § 2.102(a). 
 171. Id. § 2.102(h). 
 172. Id. § 2.401. 
 173. Id. § 2.401(c)(1).  This section was amended in 1997 to add a minimum age requirement of 
eighteen for informal marriages.  See Kingery v. Hintz, 124 S.W.3d 875, 877 n.2 (Tex. App. 2003) 
(noting that the purpose of the amendment was “to eliminate common-law marriage as a defense to 
statutory rape”). 
 174. Dan Frosch, Texas Report Says 12 Girls at Sect Ranch Were Married, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2008, at A17. 
 175. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a) (Vernon 2003). 
 176. See Frosch, supra note 174 (stating that the underage girls were “spiritually” married to 
older men). 
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b. Polygamy is Illegal in Every State 
Polygamy is illegal in Texas177 and every other state.178  The 
Supreme Court rejected challenges to laws against polygamy on 
constitutional grounds as early as the late nineteenth century.179  The 
history of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the State 
of Utah has been central to the legal debate about polygamy.  In 1890, 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints—which had previously 
endorsed plural marriages—banned the practice.180  This was apparently 
done in an attempt to gain statehood for the territory of Utah.181  In 1894, 
Congress passed the Utah Enabling Act, which required Utah to enact an 
“irrevocable” law protecting freedom of religion but forever banning 
polygamy or plural marriages.182  Utah complied, was made a state, and 
included the following provision in its constitution: 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the 
United States and the people of this State: 
First: Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No 
inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or property on 
account of his or her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or 
plural marriages are forever prohibited.183 
                                                     
 177. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01(a) (Vernon 2005): 
(a) An individual commits an offense if:  
(1) he is legally married and he:  
(A) purports to marry or does marry a person other than his spouse in this state, or any 
other state or foreign country, under circumstances that would, but for the actor’s prior 
marriage, constitute a marriage; or  
(B) lives with a person other than his spouse in this state under the appearance of being 
married; or  
(2) he knows that a married person other than his spouse is married and he:  
(A) purports to marry or does marry that person in this state, or any other state or foreign 
country, under circumstances that would, but for the person’s prior marriage, constitute a 
marriage; or  
(B) lives with that person in this state under the appearance of being married. 
An offense under this section is a third degree felony.  Id. § 25.01(e). 
 178. Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution 
Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 634 (2004) (citing HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 64–65 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 179. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
 180. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 181. Brigham Daniels, Revitalizing Zion: Nineteenth-Century Mormonism and Today’s Urban 
Sprawl, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 257, 277 (2008). 
 182. Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1102. 
 183. UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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Because of the ban on polygamy, some members of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints split from the church and became known as 
the FLDS Church.184  Members of the FLDS Church believe in and 
practice polygamy.185  Many have challenged laws prohibiting plural 
marriages, arguing that such laws are unconstitutional.186 
The Supreme Court first rejected that argument in Reynolds v. United 
States.187  The Court first concluded that a federal statute prohibiting 
bigamy was within the legislative power of Congress.188  Moreover, it 
held that the statute was constitutional and valid even as applied to 
individuals whose religion advocated plural marriages.189  Excusing 
violations of the law because the religious beliefs of the perpetrator were 
contrary to the law “would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit 
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”190  Later challenges have 
also failed.191 
In Texas, not only is it a crime for a married person to marry another, 
it is also a crime for a married person to “live[] with a person other than 
his spouse . . . under the appearance of being married.”192  Thus, even if a 
man was legally married to one of the women, he could not legally be 
married to any other woman, nor could he live with another woman 
under the appearance of being married.  This could be troubling for YFZ 
residents who did not legally marry but who live with more than one 
woman under the appearance of marriage. 
D. Fourth Amendment Protection from Unreasonable Search and 
Seizure 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
                                                     
 184. JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5, at 18. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 167. 
 191. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Plaintiff argues that 
Reynolds is no longer controlling because later cases have ‘in effect’ overturned the decision.  We 
disagree.”). 
 192. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 2005).  Under prior law, the crime of 
bigamy could be based upon a common-law marriage.  Stevens v. State, 243 S.W.2d 162, 162–63 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1951) (holding that crime of bigamy could be predicated upon a common-law 
marriage despite the fact that the second marriage was void as a matter of law). 
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against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”193  
The Fourth Amendment has been held to protect subjective expectations 
of privacy if society is prepared to recognize those expectations as 
reasonable.194  People are presumed to have an expectation of privacy in 
their homes, and courts have consistently protected that expectation.195  
“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a 
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”196  
Consequently, in most instances, in order for government officials to 
conduct a search of a person’s home, the officials must obtain a warrant 
from a neutral magistrate supported by probable cause to believe that a 
crime has been or is being committed.197  However, warrantless searches 
may be reasonable if exigent circumstances exist that render the search 
reasonable.198 
In the case of the YFZ Ranch, government officials could not 
arbitrarily enter onto the property or search the buildings, particularly the 
dwellings, without violating the Fourth Amendment.  The physical 
barriers surrounding the property and the physical isolation from other 
dwellings provided further protection, since the activities of the residents 
were shielded from the “plain view” of non-residents.199  If government 
officials did receive evidence that provided probable cause of a crime, 
then a warrant could be issued and a search conducted in accordance 
with that warrant would not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Furthermore, police may enter and search a home without a warrant 
in order to render emergency aid or to protect an occupant from 
imminent harm;200 these would qualify as exigent circumstances that 
would obviate the need for a warrant.201  Consequently, government 
officials would be able to intervene and search the YFZ Ranch without a  
 
                                                     
 193. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 194. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 195. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth 
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961))). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (noting that searches of homes 
usually require a warrant supported by probable cause). 
 198. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 199. The Supreme Court has held that visual observation of a home is not a search at all, thus the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.  “The Fourth Amendment protection of 
the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when 
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
 200. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403–04. 
 201. Id. 
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warrant if such steps were necessary to protect a resident, particularly a 
child, from imminent harm. 
E. Ninth Amendment 
The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, 
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.”202  Some courts and scholars have identified the 
Ninth Amendment as a constitutional source of parental rights.203  The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized the integrity of the family 
as a fundamental right protected by the Ninth Amendment,204 and 
according to the Utah Supreme Court: “The rights inherent in family 
relationships—husband-wife, parent-child, and sibling—are the most 
obvious examples of rights retained by the people. They are ‘natural,’ 
‘intrinsic,’ or ‘prior’ in the sense that our Constitutions presuppose them, 
as they presuppose the right to own and dispose of property.”205  Despite 
these authorities, courts tend to rely on or cite the Ninth Amendment 
only in conjunction with other constitutional rights, perhaps because the 
precise contours and meaning of the Ninth Amendment have not been as 
clearly defined as those of other constitutional provisions.206  Still, at 
least with respect to parental rights, the Ninth Amendment provides 
another layer of constitutional protection. 
IV. PRIVACY PROTECTION CONFERRED BY STATE LAWS 
A. State Constitutions That Specifically Include a Right of Privacy That 
Protects Against Intrusion by the Government 
Many state constitutions include provisions relating to religious and 
privacy rights.  For example, the Texas Constitution states: 
                                                     
 202. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 203. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my view, 
[the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children] is among the ‘unalienable 
Rights’ . . . .”); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372–74 (Utah 1982) (citing Ninth Amendment as source 
of parental rights); Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a 
Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 183, 189 (1996) 
(“[T]here is in fact a single expansive, fundamental right to direct the upbringing of one’s children 
protected under the Ninth Amendment.”). 
 204. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
 205. In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1373. 
 206. See Comment, supra note 203, at 208 (noting the longstanding view that the Ninth 
Amendment poses the danger of “judicial freewheeling” and quoting Judge Bork’s statement during 
his Senate confirmation hearing that the Ninth Amendment is an “ink blot”). 
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All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences.  No man shall be 
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any ministry against his consent.  No human authority ought, 
in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given 
by law to any religious society or mode of worship.  But it shall be the 
duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect 
equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its 
own mode of public worship.207 
This provision grants affirmative rights with respect to religion that go 
well beyond any protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution.208  
Consequently, the Texas Constitution may provide protection to the YFZ 
residents that the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes do not. 
The California Constitution includes a specific provision protecting 
privacy.  Under this provision, “[a]ll people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, 
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”209  This 
explicit right to privacy has been interpreted by California courts to 
encompass greater privacy rights than those found in the U.S. 
Constitution.210  In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, the 
California Supreme Court held that a state statute requiring pregnant 
minors to secure parental consent or judicial authorization before 
obtaining abortions violated the state constitutional right of privacy.211  
The Court noted that “not only is the state constitutional right of privacy 
embodied in explicit constitutional language not present in the federal 
Constitution, but past California cases establish that, in many contexts, 
the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy is 
broader and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional 
right of privacy as interpreted by the federal courts.”212 
In contrast, the Pennsylvania Constitution uses language 
substantially similar to the U.S. Constitution, yet Pennsylvania courts 
have interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide greater privacy 
                                                     
 207. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
 208. Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App. 2001) (“The intention of the framers and 
ratifiers of the Texas Constitution, as evident in the plain meaning of the words they used, compels 
the conclusion that Article I, Section 6 provides broader protection of religious freedom than the 
First Amendment.”). 
 209. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 210. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997). 
 211. Id. at 800. 
 212. Id. at 808. 
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rights than the U.S. Constitution.213  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has acknowledged broader state privacy rights not recognized in the 
federal context by granting automatic standing to assert search and 
seizure violations, rejecting the good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement, requiring warrants prior to placing pen registers, and 
finding that a sniff by a drug-sniffing dog constitutes a search.214 
B. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
After the United States Supreme Court decided City of Boerne v. 
Flores in 1997, holding that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act could not be applied to the states,215 several states, including Texas, 
passed similar acts that apply to state law.216  In Texas, the statute states: 
(a) Subject to Subsection (b), a government agency may not 
substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion. 
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply if the government agency 
demonstrates that the application of the burden to the person: 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.217 
This statute was enacted in 1999 and makes the compelling interest test 
applicable to Texas state laws.218  In fact, section 110.001 directs courts 
to “give weight to the interpretation of compelling interest in federal case 
                                                     
 213. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. 1997) (“The protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Pennsylvania Constitution is broader than 
that under the federal Constitution.”).  Similarly, the Utah Constitution uses language that is nearly 
identical to the U.S. Constitution, but Utah courts have found that the Utah Constitution offers 
greater privacy than its federal counterpart.  See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417–18 
(Utah 1991) (rejecting contrary federal Fourth Amendment precedent to hold that a depositor has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank records). 
 214. Seth F. Kreimer, The Right to Privacy in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. 
L. 77, 84–85 (1993). 
 215. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
 216. Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas have passed Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts with language similar to the federal statute.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
52-571b(b) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 
(West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302, 1.307 (West Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 253 
(West 2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (Vernon 2005); Kimberly A. Yuracko, 
Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 129 
(2008). 
 217. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003. 
 218. See id. 
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law relating to the free exercise of religion clause of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution” when deciding whether 
the asserted interest is a compelling governmental interest.219  The 
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, and Oklahoma statutes have 
similar language.220 
C. Statutes Authorizing State Intervention in Family Relationships 
1. Taking Possession of Children Without the Consent of a Parent or 
Guardian 
While the U.S. Constitution protects parents’ rights with respect to 
the rearing of their children, those rights are not unlimited.  Specifically, 
parents have no right to neglect or abuse their children.  States are 
allowed and even required to intervene to protect children from their 
parents if the health, safety, or well-being of the child is in jeopardy.  
Thus, while parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their 
children and generally cannot be deprived of their right to raise their 
children as they see fit, if the government has evidence that the child is in 
danger, the state’s interest in protecting the child trumps the parents’ 
rights.221 
In the case of the YFZ children, Texas law prevents state officials 
from removing children from the custody of their parent or guardian 
except under very specific circumstances in which there is evidence that 
the health or safety of the child is in danger.222  In order for a court to 
issue an emergency order authorizing the government to take possession 
of a child, the court must find: (1) that a child’s physical health or safety 
is in immediate danger, or that the child has been neglected or sexually 
abused; (2) that leaving the child in the home is contrary to the child’s 
welfare; (3) there is no time for a full adversary hearing; and (4) 
reasonable efforts have been made, consistent with the circumstances and  
 
                                                     
 219. Id. § 110.001. 
 220. Yuracko, supra note 216, at 129. 
 221. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“But the family itself is not 
beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.  And neither rights of 
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. . . . The right to practice religion freely does 
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill 
health or death.” (citations omitted)). 
 222. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.001 (Vernon 2002).  Chapter 262 of the Texas Family 
Code is titled “Procedures in Suit by Governmental Entity to Protect Health and Safety of Child.”  
See id. 
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the safety of the child, to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the 
child from the home.223 
A representative of the Department of Family and Protective 
Services, a law enforcement officer, or a juvenile probation officer may 
take possession of a child without a court order only if there is no time to 
obtain an order and the official has “personal knowledge of facts that 
would lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution to believe that 
there is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the 
child,” to believe that the child has been a victim of sexual abuse, or to 
believe that the person with possession of the child is using a controlled 
substance and the use constitutes an immediate danger to the physical 
health or safety of the child.224 
2. Terminating the Parent-Child Relationship 
States also have authority to terminate the relationship between 
parents and their children, but only in the most extreme circumstances.225 
                                                     
 223. Id. § 262.102(a). 
 224. Id. § 262.104.  The full text of the section reads as follows: 
Taking Possession of a Child in Emergency Without a Court Order 
(a) If there is no time to obtain a temporary restraining order or attachment before taking 
possession of a child consistent with the health and safety of that child, an authorized 
representative of the Department of Family and Protective Services, a law enforcement 
officer, or a juvenile probation officer may take possession of a child without a court 
order under the following conditions, only: 
(1) on personal knowledge of facts that would lead a person of ordinary prudence and 
caution to believe that there is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the 
child; 
(2) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by personal 
knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a person of ordinary 
prudence and caution to believe that there is an immediate danger to the physical health 
or safety of the child; 
(3) on personal knowledge of facts that would lead a person of ordinary prudence and 
caution to believe that the child has been the victim of sexual abuse; 
(4) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by personal 
knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a person of ordinary 
prudence and caution to believe that the child has been the victim of sexual abuse; or 
(5) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by personal 
knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a person of ordinary 
prudence and caution to believe that the parent or person who has possession of the child 
is currently using a controlled substance as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety 
Code, and the use constitutes an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the 
child. 
Id. § 262.104(a). 
 225. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
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The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, 
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they 
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their 
child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents 
retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their 
family life.  If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their 
parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than 
do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.  When 
the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide 
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.226 
Before a state can irrevocably terminate a person’s parental rights, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution requires that the state prove its allegations of abuse or 
neglect with clear and convincing evidence.227  The Texas statute 
providing for termination of the parent-child relationship adopts the clear 
and convincing standard and allows for termination of parental rights 
only if the state can prove that the parent is guilty of one of the 
enumerated instances of abuse or neglect and that termination is in the 
best interests of the child.228  In cases in which the state seeks to 
terminate parental rights, indigent parents have the right to have counsel 
appointed to represent them in all critical stages of the proceedings.229 
D. Tort Laws Protecting Against Intrusion by Private Individuals 
1. Privacy Torts 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes four different claims 
for invasion of privacy: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of 
name or likeness; (3) publicity given to private life; and (4) publicity 
                                                     
 226. Id. at 753–54. 
 227. Id. at 747–48. 
 228. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 2008).  The statute authorizes the court to 
terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds clear and convincing evidence of abuse, neglect, or 
endangerment, including voluntarily leaving the child alone, endangering the physical or emotional 
well-being of the child, causing the failure of the child to be enrolled in school, or abandonment of 
the child.  Id.  The relationship can also be terminated if the parent engages in criminal conduct 
resulting in conviction and incarceration, if the parent causes the child to be born addicted to alcohol 
or a controlled substance, or is convicted of the murder of the child’s other parent or of another 
child.  Id.  In all cases, the court must find that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the 
best interests of the child.  Id. 
 229. Id. § 107.013(a)(1); see also In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the 
statutory right to counsel in parental rights cases embodies the right to effective assistance of 
counsel). 
0.6.0_DOBBINS FINAL 1/4/2010  10:34:47 AM 
2010] PRIVATE OPPRESSION 445 
placing person in false light.230  The intrusion tort allows recovery 
against one who intentionally intrudes “upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”231  A person commits the tort of 
appropriation if he “appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another.”232  Additionally, a person is subject to liability if 
that person publicized private information about another and “the matter 
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”233  Finally: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the 
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was 
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the 
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of 
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be 
placed.234 
Not all states recognize all four invasion of privacy claims, and the 
elements of each claim may vary by jurisdiction.  Texas recognizes only 
three types of invasion of privacy: intrusion upon seclusion, public 
disclosure of private facts, and wrongful appropriation of name or 
likeness.235 
2. Trespass 
In Texas, trespass can be a crime and a tort.  Criminal trespass 
requires proof that “(1) a person, (2) without effective consent, (3) enters 
or remains on the property or in a building of another, (4) knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly, (5) when he had notice that entry was 
forbidden or received notice to depart and failed to do so.”236  The tort of 
trespass can be established merely by proving an unauthorized entry onto 
property.237  “A trespass can be either by entry of a person on another’s 
land or by causing or permitting a thing to cross the boundary of the 
                                                     
 230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–E (1977). 
 231. Id. § 652B. 
 232. Id. § 652C. 
 233. Id. § 652D. 
 234. Id. § 652E. 
 235. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 244 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 
App. 2008). 
 236. Bader v. State, 15 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App. 2000). 
 237. Aguilar v. Trujillo, 162 S.W.3d 839, 851 (Tex. App. 2005). 
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premises.  Finally, a trespass may be committed on, beneath, or above 
the surface of the earth.”238  Laws against trespass allow the YFZ 
residents to prevent private citizens as well as government officials from 
entering onto their property without permission.  This contributes to the 
isolation of the residents and prevents contact with those in the larger 
community. 
V. CONGRESS’S RESPONSE 
A. Bill Introduced by Senator Harry Reid: “To establish a Federal 
Polygamy Task Force, to authorize assistance for victims of 
polygamy, and for other purposes”239 
On July 23, 2008, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada introduced the 
“Victims of Polygamy Assistance Act of 2008.”240  The bill included the 
following findings: large polygamist communities exist in Arizona, Utah, 
and Nevada and are expanding into other states; the polygamous 
communities are controlled by organizations that “engage in widespread 
and systematic violations” of state and federal laws; those crimes include 
child abuse, domestic violence, welfare fraud, tax evasion, public 
corruption, witness tampering, and transporting victims across state lines; 
and state and local law enforcement would benefit from the assistance of 
the federal government, including enhanced collaboration and 
information-sharing among state and federal agencies.241  Moreover, the 
bill included a finding that polygamist organizations “isolate, control, 
manipulate, and threaten victims with retribution should they ever 
abandon the organization.”242  Consequently, victims of polygamist 
organizations have unique social service needs warranting federal 
assistance.243 
The bill provided for the establishment of a Federal Polygamy Task 
Force within the Department of Justice, which would coordinate federal 
efforts and collaborate with state officials “in the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal activities of polygamist organizations in both 
Federal and State Courts.”244  The Task Force would “consist of the 
                                                     
 238. Id. (citations omitted). 
 239. Victims of Polygamy Assistance Act of 2008, S. 3313, 110th Cong. 
 240. Id. § 1. 
 241. Id. § 2. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. §§ 2–3. 
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Deputy Attorney General, the United States attorneys from affected 
Federal judicial districts, representatives of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, 
and the Department of Health and Human Services,” and any other 
federal government officer that the Deputy Attorney General considers 
necessary to achieve the goals of the Task Force.245  The purposes of the 
Task Force are to: 
 (1) formulate effective responses to the unique set of crimes 
committed by polygamist organizations; 
 (2) establish partnerships with State and local law enforcement 
agencies to share relevant information and strengthen State and Federal 
efforts to combat crimes perpetrated by polygamist organizations; 
 (3) assist States by providing strategies and support for the 
protection of witnesses; 
 (4) track the criminal behavior of polygamist organizations that 
cross State and international borders; and 
 (5) ensure that local officials charged with protecting the public are 
not corrupted because of financial, family, or membership ties to a 
polygamist organization.246 
The bill would also amend the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 by 
empowering the Director to make grants to develop and maintain 
programs for enforcing the rights of and providing social services for 
individuals victimized by polygamists.247  The bill provided that funds in 
the amount of $2 million for fiscal year 2009 and $2.5 million for the 
next four fiscal years would be appropriated to carry out these goals.248  
Finally, the bill would amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 to grant $2 million from the Attorney General to 
state and local governments to investigate and prosecute polygamist 
organizations.249 
                                                     
 245. Id. § 3(a). 
 246. Id. § 3(b). 
 247. Id. § 4. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. § 5. 
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B. Senate Committee Hearing on “Crimes Associated with Polygamy: 
The Need for a Coordinated State and Federal Response” 
The Victims of Polygamy Assistance Act of 2008 was referred to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and on July 24, 2008, the Committee held a 
hearing on “Crimes Associated with Polygamy: The Need for a 
Coordinated State and Federal Response.”250  Those testifying included 
the bill’s sponsor, Senator Harry Reid; Gregory A. Brower, United States 
Attorney for the District of Nevada; Brett Tolman, United States 
Attorney for the District of Utah; Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney 
General; Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General; Stephen Singular, 
investigative journalist and author of non-fiction books; Daniel Fischer, 
dentist and former member of the FLDS Church; and Carolyn Jessop, 
former member of the FLDS Church and former wife of Merril Jessop, 
whom she alleged runs the YFZ Ranch.251 
Carolyn Jessop testified before Congress about her “firsthand 
experiences of the systematic abuse and the disregard for the law within 
the FLDS which leads to the isolation of its most vulnerable individuals 
within any community—women and children, who live without the 
protection of laws that most Americans take for granted.”252  Jessop 
escaped from the community in 2003 with her eight children, and she co-
authored a book about her life in the community and her escape from 
it.253  In her testimony, Jessop noted that the community’s cruel practices 
and disregard for the law lead to the isolation of women and children.254  
Jessop condemned local law enforcement, nearly all of whom were 
FLDS members, for their indifference to domestic abuse and child labor 
law violations.255  Even though Jessop managed to escape, she expressed 
the apprehension she had felt at contacting government service agencies 
because she feared the legal consequences of being a former member of a 
polygamous community.256  Once Jessop did seek help, she found she did 
not qualify for the assistance she needed.257  According to Jessop, women 
leaving FLDS communities need physical, psychological, and emotional 
                                                     
 250. Crimes Associated with Polygamy: The Need for a Coordinated State and Federal 
Response: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. I (2008) [hereinafter 
Hearing]. 
 251. Id. at III. 
 252. Id. at 29 (statement of Carolyn Jessop, West Jordan, Utah). 
 253. See JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5. 
 254. Hearing, supra note 250, at 29 (statement of Carolyn Jessop, West Jordan, Utah). 
 255. Id. at 29–30. 
 256. Id. at 30. 
 257. Id. at 31. 
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support, and she argued that the federal government needs to provide 
safe havens outside FLDS communities to support women who wish to 
leave in addition to ensuring that state and federal laws are enforced in 
FLDS communities.258 
Stephen Singular is an investigative journalist and nonfiction writer 
who had been studying Warren Jeffs and the FLDS Church since 2006, 
and he focused his prepared statement on tracing Jeffs’s abusive 
practices and disregard for the legal system.259  According to Singular, 
Jeffs has ignored child labor laws, laws prohibiting minors to cross state 
lines for sexual purposes, and laws against bigamy and underage 
marriage.260  Singular’s testimony indicated that women and girls were 
not Jeffs’s only victims.261  Singular claimed that Jeffs regularly expelled 
rebellious young men out into the streets and failed to address genetic 
disorders caused by the community’s inbreeding.262  Singular noted that 
sympathetic local law enforcement and hidden financial reserves helped 
Jeffs and the FLDS Church continue this criminal lifestyle, and Singular 
asserted that an investigation by those with subpoena power in 
conjunction with cooperative former FLDS members was the only way 
to know the full extent of the FLDS Church’s crimes.263 
Daniel Fischer, a former member of the FLDS Church and the co-
founder of an organization to help expelled FLDS youth, testified as to 
his experience with the community.264  Fischer noted that FLDS 
members feel persecuted, that they are willing to sacrifice themselves 
and their families if their leader so directs, and that marriage and families 
are completely controlled by FLDS leadership.265  Fischer emphasized 
the damage to children and families caused by Jeffs’s expulsion of men 
from the community and Jeffs’s subsequent orders to their wives to 
remarry.266  Fischer urged Congress to take action to protect children 
from the illegal actions of the FLDS Church.267 
Terry Goddard, the current Arizona Attorney General, submitted a 
written statement, which he summarized in his testimony before the 
                                                     
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 24–26 (statement of Stephen Singular, Denver, Colorado). 
 260. Id. at 24–25. 
 261. Id. at 25. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 26. 
 264. Id. (statement of Daniel Fischer, Sandy, Utah). 
 265. Id. at 27. 
 266. Id. at 27–28. 
 267. Id. at 29. 
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committee.268  In his statement, Goddard observed the public backlash 
created by early Arizona law enforcement raids on the fledgling FLDS 
Church community.269  As a result, law enforcement began to ignore 
these communities, residents became suspicious of law enforcement, and 
the leaders of the communities assumed more control over their 
followers.270  In 2003, to combat these effects, Goddard and Utah 
Attorney General Mark Shurtleff formed a partnership to coordinate civil 
and criminal investigations and offer services for victims of child and 
domestic abuse.271  Goddard noted that these services, provided under the 
umbrella of the Safety Net Program, now include assistance from law 
enforcement agencies, local service agencies, advocacy groups, and 
members of the community.272 
According to Goddard, one of this initiative’s most significant 
accomplishments was the indictment of Warren Jeffs on child abuse 
charges in Arizona and Utah.273  Goddard noted that problems with law 
enforcement in the current FLDS Church communities of Colorado City 
and Hildale stem from local officer allegiance to Jeffs and Goddard’s 
Office’s limited state civil rights jurisdiction.274  Goddard suggested that 
the federal government or county sheriffs might easily assert authority 
over civil rights violations in FLDS Church communities, and he noted 
that coordination among local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies would be crucial to prosecute multi-jurisdictional crimes.275 
Finally, Goddard mentioned that the closing of FLDS Church private 
schools following Jeffs’s arrest and Jeffs’s subsequent order forbidding 
                                                     
 268. Id. at 11–12 (statement of Terry Goddard, Att’y Gen., State of Arizona). 
 269. Id. at 12. 
 270. Id.  As Mr. Goddard put it: 
I have been intent on not repeating the heavy-handed mistakes of the past. Arizona badly 
executed a police raid in 1953 known as the “Short Creek raid” that took most of the 
children in the community into custody and made them wards of the State.  And it had 
three long-term negative effects:  
  First, afterwards, governmental authorities were reluctant to do anything, to pay any 
attention to the area of Short Creek, soon renamed Colorado City, and Hildale in Utah.   
  Second, the residents of these communities became highly suspicious of Government 
at all levels.  We found that victims of abuse feared the State more than their abuser.   
  And, third, the leaders of the FLDS Church used the first two to increase their 
autocratic authority over their followers. 
Id.  The unfortunate similarities between the Short Creek raid and the raid on the YFZ Ranch are 
readily apparent. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 12–13. 
 273. Id. at 81 (written statement of Terry Goddard, Att’y Gen., State of Arizona). 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
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FLDS parents from enrolling their children in public schools were of 
particular concern.276  He noted that few parents had filed home-
schooling affidavits and that there were reports that children were being 
sent to work.277  Nonetheless, Goddard asserted that the Safety Net 
agencies were providing “legal assistance, housing, counseling, 
education and other support to victims in need.”278  Goddard mentioned 
other successes the Utah-Arizona partnership had achieved, including the 
development of a training curriculum to help professionals provide 
services to victims in polygamous communities, the establishment of a 
twenty-four-hour, toll-free helpline for victims, the passage of child 
bigamy statutes in Arizona and Utah, and the organization of town hall 
meetings to allow members of Colorado City and Hildale to converse 
with law enforcement leaders.279 
VI. RESULTING OPPRESSION 
The laws protecting privacy leave the government unable to 
investigate or intervene without credible evidence that the law has been 
violated.280  Because the perpetrators are not likely to supply that 
information, the crime may go undetected and unpunished unless the 
victim or a third party does so.  Yet there are many reasons why neither 
victims nor third parties will give the government the information 
necessary to allow intervention. 
One reason is isolation.  Those who are physically separated from 
the larger community may be unable to contact help when needed.  
Moreover, if the victim is isolated, there may not be any third-party 
witnesses who can intervene or call the authorities on the victim’s 
behalf.281  A second obstacle is ignorance.  Those who are unaware that 
they have rights that are being violated may not seek help.  This may be 
the case because of isolation; if a person has lived all of his or her life in 
an isolated community, then those beliefs and values may be all that is 
known.  He or she may have no concept of the rights and laws that 
                                                     
 276. Id. at 82. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 82–84. 
 280. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see discussion supra Part III.D. 
 281. JESSOP & PALMER, supra note 5, at 13–14.  “Our community was so isolated it was rare that 
we ever saw anyone from the outside.  Most of my cousins only left the community to go shopping 
with their mothers and had almost no sense of the outside world.”  Id.  “Even if a family knew there 
was severe abuse going on in another family, no one intervened.  This was part of the religious 
doctrine that said no man had the right to interfere with another man’s family.”  Id. at 37. 
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protect them or that behavior they have always accepted is illegal.282  For 
immigrants, language barriers may leave them without an understanding 
of law or resources available to help.283  If their legal status is an issue, 
they may be afraid to report abuse for fear of being imprisoned or 
deported.284  Moreover, their abuser may have control over their legal 
status. 
Age may also play a role.  The very young and very old may be 
unable to voice opposition, seek help, or even recognize abuse when it 
occurs.  With respect to children, parents are empowered by law to make 
decisions that affect the future of their children.  With respect to the 
elderly, they may be completely dependent upon others for their care and 
may be unable or unwilling to risk the consequences of angering or 
pressing charges against a caregiver, especially if the caregiver is a child 
or other relative.285 
VII.STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
A. Laws Respecting Privacy Limit a Government’s Ability to Protect Its 
Citizens 
Laws designed to protect citizens are limited in the sense that they 
require some evidence that illegal activity has occurred, is occurring, or 
will occur.  Government officials are not authorized to monitor or 
interfere based solely on suspicion or disapproval of the lifestyle or 
beliefs of individuals.  The Constitution, supplemented by state laws, 
gives people, particularly parents, the right to isolate themselves or live 
within an isolated community, thereby depriving outsiders or law 
enforcement of the opportunity to observe anything that would justify 
investigation or intervention.  These privacy rights effectively ensure that 
some abuse, neglect, and oppression will go undetected and unpunished. 
While it is possible to provide greater protection to children and 
other vulnerable populations, the protection would necessarily come at 
                                                     
 282. “Violence toward children was incorporated into our belief system, and it was very 
common in the community to see a mother slap one of her children, sometimes very hard.”  Id. at 
19–20.  “We were taught that the government (which was wicked) would move into our community 
and try to kill every man, woman, and child.”  Id. at 24. 
 283. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help and 
Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 46 (2003). 
 284. Id. at 47. 
 285. Mary Twomey et al., From Behind Closed Doors: Shedding Light on Elder Abuse and 
Domestic Violence in Late Life, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMS., CHILD. & CTS. 73, 75 (2005) (“Ninety 
percent of all elder abuse is perpetrated by family members.”). 
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the expense of privacy.  Indeed, many scholars, particularly feminists 
and child advocates, have criticized modern notions of family privacy 
that “can conceal, even foster, situations dangerous to the individuals 
who comprise the family unit.”286  Despite these critiques, the right to 
privacy, especially within the home and with respect to the rearing of 
children, is so deeply ingrained in American culture and is so deeply 
cherished by most parents that it is doubtful that many would be willing 
to give up those rights even if it meant saving some people from abuse or 
neglect. 
For many, the rights of parents are not simply a matter of state law, 
but of religious beliefs.287  But even if the beliefs are not religiously 
based, the right of parents to raise their children without government 
interference is longstanding and deeply held and not likely to be easily 
eroded.  In fact, in recent decades there has been a push to reassert and 
fortify parents’ rights.288  In 1995, bills were sponsored in the United 
States House of Representatives and Senate with the stated goal of 
protecting “the fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbringing of a 
child.”289  The bill stated the following findings: 
 (1) the Supreme Court has regarded the right of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children as a fundamental right implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty within the 14th amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States . . . ; 
 . . . . 
 (4) some decisions of federal and state courts have treated the right 
of parents not as a fundamental right but as a nonfundamental right, 
resulting in an improper standard of judicial review being applied to 
government conduct that adversely affects parental rights and 
prerogatives; 
 . . . . 
                                                     
 286. Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1207, 1216–17 (1999) (arguing that while there is a necessity for privacy with regard to family 
formation and functioning, “hidden beneath the cloak of privacy are power imbalances, perhaps even 
incentives for the strong to prey upon or exploit the weak. . . .  Therefore, the obvious goal should be 
to reconcile both concerns and balance family privacy with protection for family members.”); see 
also generally FINEMAN & MYKITIUK, supra note 1, at 3 (exploring “what it has meant to develop 
theory and practice around ‘the battered woman,’ ‘the rape victim,’ and ‘the cycle of violence’”). 
 287. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 401 (referencing “traditional theory of parents’ rights as God 
given or natural rights”). 
 288. See generally id. at 396–97 (examining proposed federal Parental Rights and 
Responsibilities Act of 1995). 
 289. Id. at 424 app. A. 
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 (6) governments should not interfere in the decisions and actions of 
parents without compelling justification . . . .290 
The bill would have prohibited government interference with a parent’s 
right to direct the upbringing of his or her child unless “the interference 
or usurpation is essential to accomplish a compelling governmental 
interest and is narrowly drawn or applied in a manner that is the least 
restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling interest.”291  Although 
neither the House nor Senate bill ever became law, their proposals 
indicate the continuing importance parental rights have in American 
society.  Moreover, according to the bills’ supporters, similar legislation 
was proposed in half of the states.292 
B. Methods to Encourage Limited Interaction with Governmental 
Officials Without Violating Privacy Rights 
If it is true that Americans are unwilling to have their privacy rights 
curtailed or eliminated, then solutions must be explored that respect 
privacy rights.  The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure makes it difficult for anyone else to observe 
suspicious circumstances or behavior that would alert government 
officials to a potentially abusive or unhealthy situation.  If people are 
physically isolated and limit or avoid contact with those outside of their 
home or community, then there may be no way for anyone to give the 
government sufficient reason to investigate, much less invade private 
property to determine whether laws have been broken or the rights of a 
resident have been violated.  Overcoming these obstacles without 
infringing upon privacy rights is challenging but not impossible. 
1. Interaction with Children Through the Education System 
One means of preventing oppression without violating the privacy of 
individuals is by ensuring some face-to-face interaction between 
government agents and private citizens, particularly children.  One such 
interaction could take place in connection with compulsory education 
requirements.  Every state constitution includes language requiring the 
state to establish and maintain a system of free public education.293  
                                                     
 290. Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, H.R. 1946, 104th Cong. § 2. 
 291. Id. § 5. 
 292. Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 399. 
 293. Yuracko, supra note 216, at 135. 
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Children in public schools have a great deal of interaction with the 
government because teachers and administrators are all government 
employees.  These employees are required by law to keep detailed 
records about the progress of each child and notify law enforcement if 
abuse or neglect is suspected.294 
The right to have a child educated in a private school is protected by 
the U.S. Constitution.295  These schools provide a greater degree of 
isolation and privacy than public schools, but states have the right to 
oversee the curriculum in such schools.296  Moreover, there may be at 
least some interaction with children outside of the child’s immediate 
family, although, the school may be comprised of children from families 
with the same beliefs and thereby still be relatively isolated from the 
larger community.  Additionally, there may be little regulation of private 
schools.297  However, teachers and other private school employees may 
be required by law to report suspected child abuse or neglect.298 
The children most likely to be completely isolated are those who are 
taught at home.  Every state allows home schooling, although the degree 
of regulation of home-school programs varies widely.299  In states such as 
Texas, students are allowed to be home schooled if the parent or 
guardian asserts that they are pursuing, in a bona fide (good faith, not 
sham or subterfuge) manner, a curriculum designed to meet the basic 
goals of reading, spelling, grammar, mathematics, and a study of good 
citizenship.300  The statute does not provide for any evaluation or 
                                                     
 294. “All fifty states and the District of Columbia have child abuse laws in place that require 
certain persons to report suspected child abuse.  Those held accountable include school teachers, 
school employees, and school authorities.”  Jason P. Nance & Philip T.K. Daniel, Protecting 
Students From Abuse: Public School District Liability for Student Sexual Abuse Under State Child 
Abuse Reporting Laws, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 33, 35 (2007). 
 295. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 
(1925). 
 296. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). 
 297. For example, Pennsylvania gives private schools the option of being licensed but does not 
require licensure.  24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6705 (West 2006).  If a private school chooses to be 
licensed, it must permit the school board and its representatives to “inspect the school or classes and 
make[] available to the board, at any time when requested to do so, full information pertaining to the 
operation of the school.”  Id. § 6712.  If licensure is not sought, the board does not appear to have 
the authority to conduct such inspections.  See id.  Similarly, Utah has regulations governing when a 
private school may enroll a scholarship student, but no other regulations targeting private schools.  
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-805 (West Supp. 2009). 
 298. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165–11166 (stating that teachers and teacher’s aides in 
public and private schools have a duty to report suspected child abuse or neglect); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 53A-6-502 (West 2004) (defining “educators” to include private school teachers, employees, and 
volunteers, and requiring such educators to report suspected physical or sexual abuse). 
 299. Yuracko, supra note 216, at 124. 
 300. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.086 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 
S.W.2d 432, 439 (Tex. 1944). 
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confirmation of the home-school curriculum or the progress of students 
being home schooled.301  However, the Texas Supreme Court noted: 
[T]he TEA [(Texas Education Agency)] is not precluded from 
requesting evidence of achievement test results in determining whether 
children are being taught in a bona fide manner.  While administration 
of such tests cannot be a prerequisite to exception from the compulsory 
attendance law, we do not preclude the TEA from giving this factor 
heavy weight.302 
However, currently there is neither a mechanism in place to ensure that 
whatever curriculum the parents adopt is effective, nor a mandate that the 
TEA set guidelines for home-school evaluations.  Achievement tests are 
not required and, if they are given, there are no guidelines in place 
regarding the administration of the tests or consequences if students are 
not progressing. 
Other states impose much stricter regulations on parents who choose 
to home school their children.  For example, in Pennsylvania, parents 
must file a notarized affidavit stating their intention to commence a 
home-education program and that the program complies with the 
requirements of the home-education statute by the first of August.303  The 
statute also specifies the number of days and hours per year of instruction 
that the child must receive and lists the courses that must be taught.304 
                                                     
 301. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.086. 
 302. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 444. 
 303. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(b)(1) (West 2006).  The affidavit must also include 
the name of the person responsible for providing instruction, the name and age of each child in the 
home education program, and the address and telephone number of the home education program site.  
Id.  Moreover, the affidavit must state that required subjects will be taught in English and must 
include an outline of proposed education objectives by subject area.  Id.  Additionally, the parent 
must provide evidence that the child has received the required immunizations and has received the 
health and medical services required for students of the child’s age or grade level.  Id.  Finally, the 
affidavit must certify that no adult living in the home or having custody of a child in the home 
education program has been convicted of certain criminal offenses within the prior five years.  Id. 
 304. Id. § 13-1327.1.  The statute reads as follows: 
(c) A child who is enrolled in a home education program and whose education is 
therefore under the direct supervision of his parent, guardian or other person having legal 
custody shall be deemed to have met the requirements of section 1327 if that home 
education program provides a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days of instruction 
or nine hundred (900) hours of instruction per year at the elementary level, or nine 
hundred ninety (990) hours per year at the secondary level: 
(1) At the elementary school level, the following courses shall be taught: English, to 
include spelling, reading and writing; arithmetic; science; geography; history of the 
United States and Pennsylvania; civics; safety education, including regular and 
continuous instruction in the dangers and prevention of fires; health and physiology; 
physical education; music; and art. 
(2) At the secondary school level, the following courses shall be taught: English, to 
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The Pennsylvania statute also provides for significant oversight of 
the home-education program and evaluation of the home-educated 
child’s progress: 
In order to demonstrate that appropriate education is occurring, the 
supervisor of the home education program shall provide and maintain 
on file the following documentation for each student enrolled in the 
home education program: 
(1) A portfolio of records and materials. The portfolio shall consist of a 
log, made contemporaneously with the instruction, which designates by 
title the reading materials used, samples of any writings, worksheets, 
workbooks or creative materials used or developed by the student and 
in grades three, five and eight results of nationally normed standardized 
achievement tests in reading/language arts and mathematics or the 
results of Statewide tests administered in these grade levels. . . . 
 . . . . 
(2) An annual written evaluation of the student’s educational progress 
as determined by a licensed clinical or school psychologist or a teacher 
certified by the Commonwealth or by a nonpublic school teacher or 
administrator. . . . The evaluation shall also be based on an interview of 
the child and a review of the portfolio required in clause (1) and shall 
certify whether or not an appropriate education is occurring.  At the 
request of the supervisor, persons with other qualifications may 
conduct the evaluation with the prior consent of the district of residence 
superintendent.  In no event shall the evaluator be the supervisor or 
their spouse.305 
                                                                                                                       
include language, literature, speech and composition; science; geography; social studies, 
to include civics, world history, history of the United States and Pennsylvania; 
mathematics, to include general mathematics, algebra and geometry; art; music; physical 
education; health; and safety education, including regular and continuous instruction in 
the dangers and prevention of fires.  Such courses of study may include, at the discretion 
of the supervisor of the home education program, economics; biology; chemistry; foreign 
languages; trigonometry; or other age-appropriate courses as contained in Chapter 5 
(Curriculum Requirements) of the State Board of Education. 
(d) The following minimum courses in grades nine through twelve are established as a 
requirement for graduation in a home education program: 
(1) Four years of English. 
(2) Three years of mathematics. 
(3) Three years of science. 
(4) Three years of social studies. 
(5) Two years of arts and humanities. 
Id. § 13-1327.1(c)–(d). 
 305. Id. § 13-1327.1(e). 
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The documentation described above must be submitted to the school 
district superintendent at the end of the public school year.306 
If the superintendent reviews the documentation and concludes “that 
appropriate education is not taking place for the child in the home 
education program,” the superintendent must send a certified letter to the 
supervisor of the home-education program stating his or her opinion and 
“specifying what aspect or aspects of the documentation are 
inadequate.”307  The home-education supervisor has twenty days from 
receipt of the letter to submit additional documentation establishing that 
the child is receiving an appropriate education.308  If the additional 
documentation fails to convince the superintendent that appropriate 
education is taking place, the school board will arrange for a hearing to 
be conducted by an impartial hearing examiner.309  Under certain 
circumstances the hearing examiner may place the child in public school: 
If the hearing examiner finds that the documentation does not indicate 
that appropriate education is taking place in the home education 
program, the home education program for the child shall be out of 
compliance with the requirements of [the home education statute], and 
the student shall be promptly enrolled in the public school district of 
residence or a nonpublic school or a licensed private academic 
school.310 
Neither the home-education supervisor nor his or her spouse is eligible to 
supervise the home education for a child for a period of twelve months 
after that child’s home-education program is determined to be out of 
compliance with the home-education statute.311 
a. Constitutional Challenges to Home-Schooling Statutes that Allow for 
or Require Ongoing Evaluation and Oversight of Home-Schooling 
Programs 
Constitutional challenges to statutes such as Pennsylvania’s 
generally have not been successful.  In Combs v. Homer-Center School 
District, parents alleged that the reporting and review requirements of 
Pennsylvania’s compulsory education law violated their religious beliefs 
                                                     
 306. Id. § 13-1327.1(h). 
 307. Id. § 13-1327.1(i). 
 308. Id. § 13-1327.1(j). 
 309. Id. § 13-1327.1(k). 
 310. Id. § 13-1327.1(l). 
 311. Id. § 13-1327.1(m). 
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and their fundamental right to direct the schooling and upbringing of 
their children.312  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review 
Pennsylvania’s education law under strict scrutiny and instead applied 
rational-basis review to determine that the law’s disclosure and review 
requirements rationally furthered legitimate state interests.313  The 
parents alternatively claimed that the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder314 applied to their claim.315  The court of appeals 
distinguished Yoder, noting that the compulsory education requirements 
sought to be imposed on the Amish plaintiffs in Yoder threatened their 
“entire mode of life,” while here the Pennsylvania requirements did not 
pose such a risk.316 
Similar challenges in other states have also been defeated.  In 
Murphy v. Arkansas, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
constitutionality of the Arkansas Home School Act after a home-
schooling couple alleged the Act deprived them of their right to the free 
exercise of religion, due process of law, equal protection of the laws, and 
privacy and parental liberty.317  The Arkansas Home School Act required 
home-schooling parents to notify their local school district and provide 
“the name, age, and grade of each student, the core curriculum to be 
offered, the schedule of instruction and the qualifications of the person 
teaching.”318  The Act also required parents to submit each child to a 
standardized achievement test each year, which the parents would choose 
from an approved list, and to a minimum performance test when the 
child reached age fourteen.319  The court found that the state’s 
compelling interest in the education of its children would not be 
sufficiently safeguarded by parental testing and progress reporting, that 
the Act passed rational basis scrutiny, and that the right of privacy did 
not give parents the right to make educational decisions for their children 
unfettered by reasonable governmental regulation.320 
In Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District of North 
Carolina, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that North 
Carolina’s interest in compulsory education was sufficient to override the 
                                                     
 312. Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 313. Id. at 243. 
 314. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 315. Combs, 540 F.3d at 249. 
 316. Id. at 251. 
 317. Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 318. Id. at 1040. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 1043–44. 
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religious interest claimed by a home-schooling parent.321  In Duro, a 
father alleged that his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
were infringed by North Carolina’s compulsory school-attendance law 
because sending his children to either a public or private school would 
violate his religious beliefs.322  The children in Duro were taught at home 
by their mother, who had no educational training.323  The district court 
applied Yoder to find that the compulsory education law was 
unconstitutional as applied to the father.324  The court of appeals 
reversed, noting that the Amish community was uniquely situated and 
did allow their children to attend public school through eighth grade, 
while the Duros were not members of such a community and refused to 
permit their children to attend outside schools at all.325  The court found 
that the father had not demonstrated that home instruction would 
“prepare his children to be self-sufficient participants in our modern 
society or enable them to participate intelligently in our political 
system,” which the court found was a compelling interest of the state.326 
The Riveras were home-schooling parents convicted of failing to 
provide an annual home-schooling report to their local school district as 
required by Iowa statute.327  The Riveras argued that the reporting 
requirement violated their free exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment.328  The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed with the Riveras and 
affirmed their convictions, finding that “the state’s interest in assuring 
quality education for its children was not outweighed by the resulting 
burden on the parents’ religious beliefs” and that “no alternative means 
to the reporting requirements . . . would adequately serve the state’s 
purposes . . . .”329 
                                                     
 321. 712 F.2d 96, 96–97 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 322. Id. at 97. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 98. 
 326. Id. at 99. 
 327. State v. Rivera, 497 N.W.2d 878, 879–81 (Iowa 1993). 
 328. Id. at 879. 
 329. Id. at 880–81.  See also In re Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093, 1094 Syl. 2 (Kan. 1983) 
(“[U]naccredited, unplanned, and unscheduled home instruction with an uncertified teacher does not 
satisfy . . . compulsory school attendance law,” and law had rational relationship to legitimate state 
purpose of educating its children); Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1377 
(Me. 1988) (“[P]rior approval requirement did not violate parents’ right to free exercise of religion, 
and state constitution and Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of U.S. Constitution afforded 
parents no additional protection beyond that provided by the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.”); State v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627, 627 (Ohio 1987) (requirement that parents “seek 
approval of local superintendent for their home education program . . . reasonably furthers state’s 
interest in education . . . and does not infringe upon free exercise of religion”). 
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The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a teacher certification 
requirement does not violate parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.330  
In People v. Bennett, home-schooling parents were convicted of four 
counts of violating the compulsory education law.331  The parents argued 
that the teaching certification requirement of Michigan’s guidelines 
regarding home schooling violated their rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to direct their children’s education.332  The court held that 
the parents did not have a fundamental right to direct their children’s 
education free from reasonable regulation, and thus that the parents’ 
asserted right was not subject to strict scrutiny.333  Under a minimal 
scrutiny test, the court found that the parents failed to show that the 
certified teaching requirement was unreasonable.334 
b. Successful Challenges to Home-Schooling Statutes 
Some challenges to home-schooling statutes have been successful.  
However, these challenges tend to focus on statutes that are vague or 
especially intrusive.  Many successful challenges also alleged violations 
of state law instead of or in addition to federal law.  For example, in 
Brunelle v. Lynn Public Schools, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held 
that home visits could not be imposed as a condition of approval of 
parents’ home-schooling plans.335  Parents proposing to educate their 
children at home filed suit against a public school district and district 
officials for a declaratory judgment that the requirement for home visits 
as a condition of approval of the parents’ home-schooling plans violated 
their rights under Massachusetts law and the Massachusetts 
Constitution.336  The Massachusetts compulsory education law did not 
mandate home visits but “[gave] local school officials discretion to 
develop home school approval guidelines.”337  The court noted it had 
previously held that home-education proposals could be made subject 
only to “essential” and “reasonable” requirements, and it concluded that 
home visits were not presumptively essential to Massachusetts’s interest  
 
                                                     
 330. People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 111–12 (Mich. 1993). 
 331. Id. at 108. 
 332. Id. at 107–08. 
 333. Id. at 111–12. 
 334. Id. at 117. 
 335. Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Schs., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1187 (Mass. 1998). 
 336. Id. at 1183–84. 
 337. Id. at 1185. 
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in education and could not be imposed as a condition of approval of 
parents’ plans.338 
In some states, the wording of the compulsory education statute was 
deemed too vague to be enforceable against parents who home schooled 
their children.  In State v. Popanz, the defendant was a home-schooling 
father convicted of violating Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance 
law.339  The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the phrase “private 
school” in the Wisconsin statute was impermissibly vague and violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, as the statute did not define “private school” and 
left such determination to the sole discretion of the school attendance 
officer of the district.340  Similarly, in Roemhild v. State, the defendants 
were home-schooling parents convicted of violating Georgia’s 
compulsory attendance law.341  The Georgia Supreme Court held that the 
phrase “private school” in the Georgia statute was unconstitutionally 
vague because it failed to include a definition of “private school” and left 
such determination to the sole discretion of local officials.342 
South Carolina has struck down a requirement relating to the 
qualifications of home-school instructors.  In Lawrence v. South 
Carolina State Board of Education, home-schooling parents brought an 
action to enjoin enforcement of a South Carolina statute requiring 
“parents holding only a high school diploma to pass a basic skills 
examination known as the Education Entrance Examination (EEE) in 
order to be approved for home schooling.”343  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court noted that under Yoder the state has the power to impose 
only “reasonable standards” on home-schooling programs available as an 
                                                     
 338. Id. at 1184. 
 339. State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750, 751–52 (Wis. 1983). 
 340. Id. at 752, 755. 
 341. Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 155–56 (Ga. 1983). 
 342. Id. at 157.  Other states have upheld similarly vague statutes.  In Burrow v. State, a father 
homeschooling his daughter was convicted of violating Arkansas’s compulsory school attendance 
law.  Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441, 442–43 (Ark. 1984).  He argued that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because it required attendance at a “public, private or parochial school” but 
did not define “school.”  Id. at 443.  The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the 
language of the statute was “clear enough . . . to put [the defendant] on adequate notice that a course 
of home study would not constitute a school within the meaning of the statute.”  Id.  Likewise, in 
State v. Moorhead, home schooling parents in Iowa argued that the compulsory attendance law was 
unconstitutionally vague and violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  308 
N.W. 2d 60, 61–62 (Iowa 1981).  The statute exempted students receiving “equivalent instruction by 
a certified teacher elsewhere” from the compulsory education requirement, and the defendants 
argued that the statute’s failure to define “equivalent instruction” and “certified teacher” rendered 
the statute unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 62–63.  The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 
the statute sufficiently put citizens on notice as to what the statute required.  Id. at 64. 
 343. Lawrence v. S.C. State Bd. of Educ., 412 S.E.2d 394, 394 (S.C. 1991). 
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alternative to compulsory school attendance in order to protect home-
schoolers’ free exercise of religion.344  Here, the court held that the 
procedures used to test home-school instructors did not meet a standard 
of reasonableness.345 
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down a teacher 
certification requirement for home-schooling families.346  In People v. 
DeJonge, parents objected to the requirement on the grounds that their 
religious beliefs prohibited allowing anyone else to teach their 
children.347  The DeJonge parents did not meet the teacher certification 
requirement, yet at trial, the prosecution never questioned the adequacy 
of the DeJonges’ instruction or the education the children received.348  
The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately held “that the teacher 
certification requirement [was] an unconstitutional violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to families whose 
religious convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors.”349 
First, the court noted that a claim that the statute violated the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with a claimed 
violation of parents’ right to direct their children’s education demanded 
application of strict scrutiny.350  The Michigan Supreme Court articulated 
the strict scrutiny test as the “compelling interest” test with five 
elements: 
(1) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is 
sincerely held; 
                                                     
 344. Id. at 395. 
 345. Id. at 396. 
 346. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Mich. 1993).  In DeJonge, homeschooling 
parents were convicted of instructing their children without the aid of certified teachers, in violation 
of Michigan’s compulsory education law.  Id. at 129–30.  The Ottawa Circuit Court affirmed their 
convictions, and the case was consolidated with another case on appeal.  Id. at 130.  The court of 
appeals affirmed both trial court decisions and reaffirmed their convictions on rehearing.  Id.  On 
October 17, 1990, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of recent United States Supreme Court 
precedent.  Id. at 131.  On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed the defendants’ convictions.  
Id. 
 347.  Mark DeJonge testified that Michigan’s requirement that all children be taught by 
certified teachers violates their religious beliefs because the family “believes that 
scripture . . . teaches that parents are the ones that are responsible to God for the 
education of their children.  And for us to allow the State to insert [sic] God’s 
authority, for us to submit to that would be a sin.” 
Id. at 130 n.4. 
 348. Id. at 130. 
 349. Id. at 129. 
 350. Id. at 134.  The court further noted that Michigan’s Constitution mandated strict scrutiny 
under these circumstances as well.  Id. at 134 n.27. 
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(2) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is 
religious in nature; 
(3) whether a state regulation imposes a burden on the exercise of such 
belief or conduct; 
(4) whether a compelling state interest justifies the burden imposed 
upon a defendant’s belief or conduct; 
(5) whether there is a less obtrusive form of regulation available to the 
state.351 
The court held that the first and second elements were met because 
the DeJonges’ beliefs were sincerely held and those beliefs were 
religiously based.352  The court further held that the teacher certification 
statute imposed a burden on the DeJonges’ exercise of their beliefs.353  
Thus, the third element was met.354 
The final two elements were the most controversial.  The state 
claimed “a compelling [] interest in ensuring the adequate education of 
all children.”355  The court acknowledged this interest, but disagreed that 
this interest was at issue in the case: 
The state’s interest is not ensuring that the goals of compulsory 
education are met, because the state does not contest that the DeJonges 
are succeeding at fulfilling such aims.  Rather, the state’s interest is 
simply the certification requirement of the private school act, not the 
general objectives of compulsory education.  The interest the state 
pursues is the manner of education, not its goals.356 
Thus, the proper inquiry was whether this interest in upholding the 
teacher certification requirement was a compelling interest and, if so, 
whether this interest could be achieved through less obtrusive means.357  
The court held that the certification requirement was not a compelling 
interest.358  It noted that it was undisputed that the DeJonge children were 
                                                     
 351. Id. at 135. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 136–37. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 138. 
 356. Id. at 139. 
 357. Id. at 140. 
 358. Id.  “[T]he state in the instant case has failed to provide evidence or testimony that supports 
the argument that the certification requirement is essential to the preservation of its asserted 
interest.”  Id. 
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receiving “more than an adequate education.”359  Moreover, the court 
noted that few states retained a certification requirement for home 
schools, with more than twenty states repealing their teacher certification 
requirements in the prior decade.360 
Finally, the court noted that even if the state had stated a compelling 
interest, it had not established that the certification requirement was the 
least obtrusive means of achieving that interest.361  The court noted that 
monitoring or evaluation by the state could ensure that adequate 
education is taking place without unduly burdening the DeJonges’ 
religious freedom.362  The court held that “the teacher certification 
requirement is an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment as applied to families whose religious 
convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors.”363 
c. Proposals for States with Little or No Oversight of Home-School 
Programs 
States such as Texas, which currently require no oversight or 
evaluation of home-school programs or the progress of children being 
home schooled, could require some form of periodic evaluation.  If a 
parent chooses to administer achievement tests, the state could require 
that some governmental official be present during the testing.  Other, 
more subjective, forms of evaluation could also be employed.  For 
example, children could be interviewed about what they have learned.  
This could be especially appropriate if a child has a learning disability 
that would make standardized testing an inaccurate means of evaluating 
the child’s progress.  Again, the key would be some face-to-face 
interaction with a government official who would be able to confirm that 
the child is learning and the curriculum is being taught.  It also allows the 
official to observe and report any obvious signs of abuse or neglect. 
If more stringent evaluation requirements had been in place in Texas, 
officials might have had a better relationship with the YFZ families, or at 
least a better understanding of the identities of the children living on the 
Ranch.  Additionally, officials might have noted the pregnancies of the 
underage girls and thus would have had grounds to investigate and 
intervene.  Moreover, the curriculum is established by state law and 
                                                     
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 141. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 143. 
 363. Id. at 144. 
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every state could include civics or government as required subjects in 
public, private, and home-school curriculums.364  Including these 
subjects as part of the testing or evaluation process would help ensure 
that all children graduate with a basic understanding of how the 
government works and their basic rights under the law. 
These suggestions are not intended to discourage or infringe upon 
parents’ rights to educate their children in the manner they deem 
appropriate.  Instead, it is intended to ensure that the parent’s choice does 
not violate the children’s rights.  Note that steps should be taken to 
ensure that the privacy of the parents is not unduly violated.  Obviously, 
the rules would not be limited to children of particular religious or 
political beliefs.  No information need be gathered other than that related 
to the educational progress of the student.  It is not intended to be a 
covert investigation (search or seizure) but merely one way to ensure 
compliance with compulsory education while having the incidental 
benefit of giving an opportunity for intervention if necessary. 
d. Prohibiting Home Schooling When There is Evidence the Child May 
Be in Danger in the Home 
The right to home school is not unlimited.  Although parents have a 
due process right to direct their children’s education365 and the right to 
free exercise of their religion,366 a law that infringes upon a constitutional 
right may be upheld if the law furthers a compelling governmental 
interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that end.367  One such 
compelling interest is education.368  Consequently, states are entitled to 
regulate home-school programs and to enforce reasonable requirements 
if those requirements are narrowly tailored.369  If the state can 
                                                     
 364. Currently, all states note the need for civics or government as part of a solid education, but 
it is not a required course in all states.  See Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, 
Current Status, and the Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (1999).  “Although a study of state 
curriculum guidelines will reveal that every state notes the need for civic education, this important 
part of the student’s overall education is seldom given sustained and systematic attention in the 
kindergarten through twelfth grade curriculum.”  Id. 
 365. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 366. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 367. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Infringements on [the right to 
associate] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests . . . .”); 
Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (parents’ power may 
be limited if they will place the child in jeopardy). 
 368. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (“[A] State’s interest in universal 
education . . . is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights 
and interests . . . .”). 
 369. See, e.g., Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 594 (holding that a child’s safety is a compelling 
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demonstrate that appropriate education is not taking place in the home-
school program, the state should require the parents to send the child to a 
public or private school. 
States may also deny parents the right to home school their children 
if there is evidence that the child’s health or well-being is at risk.370  For 
instance, in Pennsylvania, the affidavit that parents must submit in order 
to institute a home-education program must include a statement that “the 
supervisor, all adults living in the home and persons having legal custody 
of a child or children in a home-education program have not been 
convicted of the criminal offenses enumerated in [title 24, section 111(e) 
of the Pennsylvania statutes] within five years immediately preceding the 
date of the affidavit.”371  If this requirement is not met, the parent may 
not institute a home-education program.372 
At least one California appellate court has held that restricting a 
parent’s right to home school if the child has been declared dependent 
because of the abuse or neglect of other children in the home is 
constitutional.373  In Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, the court 
acknowledged that California statutes permit home schooling as a 
species of private school education.374  However, the statutory 
permission to home school may constitutionally be overridden in order to 
protect the safety of a child who has been declared dependent.375  The 
two children in Jonathan L. were declared dependent due to the known 
abuse of their siblings.376  The children’s “attorney sought an order that 
they be sent to private or public school, rather than educated at home by 
their mother, so that they would be in regular contact with mandatory 
reporters of abuse and neglect.”377  The dependency court declined to 
issue such an order, determining “that parents have an absolute 
constitutional right to home school their children.”378 
                                                                                                                       
governmental interest and that restricting home schooling is narrowly tailored to achieve it). 
 370. Id. 
 371. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(b)(1) (West 2006).  The offenses in subsection (e) of 
section 111 include: criminal homicide, aggravated assault, stalking, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, 
rape, statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, indecent assault, 
indecent exposure, incest, concealing the death of a child, endangering the welfare of children, 
dealing in infant children, prostitution, corruption of minors, and sexual abuse of children.  Id. § 1-
111(e) (West Supp. 2009). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593. 
 374. Id. at 590. 
 375. Id. at 593. 
 376. Id. at 576. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
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The children’s counsel sought relief by a petition for an 
extraordinary writ to the court of appeal, and the court initially granted 
the petition on the grounds that California statutory law does not permit 
home schooling and that such a prohibition did not violate the U.S. 
Constitution.379  The court granted a rehearing in order to provide an 
opportunity for further argument on the multiple complex issues and to 
invite a number of governmental and private parties to submit amicus 
curiae briefs.380  The court ultimately decided that the legislature had 
accepted home schools in California when they were conducted as 
private schools.381 
Next, the court considered whether a parent’s right to home school 
his or her children could be overridden to protect the health or safety of 
the child.382  The court acknowledged that United States Supreme Court 
cases have held that parents have “a liberty interest, protected by the due 
process clause, in directing the education of their children.”383  However, 
it was unclear what level of scrutiny should be applied to restrictions on 
that right.384  The court concluded that it need not decide what level of 
scrutiny is appropriate since the restriction in question satisfied strict 
scrutiny and, therefore, would satisfy any lesser test as well.385  In 
applying strict scrutiny, the court noted that the welfare of a child is a 
compelling state interest.386  Moreover, “[t]he United States Supreme 
Court in Yoder recognized that ‘the power of a parent, even when linked 
to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that 
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of a child.’”387 
                                                     
 379. Id. at 576–77. 
 380. Id. at 577. 
 381. Id. at 577–78. 
 382. Id. at 592. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id.  Early cases applied a rational basis test while more recent cases have indicated that 
strict scrutiny would be appropriate.  Id. 
 385. Id. at 593. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972)).  See also Cassady v. 
Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that trial court had discretion to 
order custodial parent to send child to an appropriate public, private, or parochial school, rather than 
homeschool, in light of trial court’s determinations that mother had difficulty coping with the 
stresses and pressures of life, had questionable decision-making ability, and had “delusional quality 
in her thinking”); Sloand v. Sloand, 816 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (modification of 
custody order, pursuant to which mother had sole custody of child, to grant father custody of child, 
was in child’s best interests; mother, who suffered from either schizotypal personality disorder or 
undifferentiated schizophrenia, intended to home school child, although she lacked teaching 
experience, had not had full-time employment for many years, and had failed to respect child’s 
educational requirements, such as regular and punctual attendance). 
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But even the compelling state interest will not justify a restriction 
unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.388  In 
Jonathan L., the restriction at issue was a court order preventing the 
parents from home schooling their children and instead requiring the 
children to attend public or private school where the teachers were 
required to report suspected abuse or neglect.389  The court concluded 
that such an order was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of protecting 
children.390  “Without contact with mandated reporters, it may well be 
that the child’s safety cannot be guaranteed without removing the child 
from the parents’ custody. . . . As such, the restriction on home schooling 
would be the least restrictive means of achieving the goal of protecting 
the children . . . .”391 
The Jonathan L. case is significant not only because it acknowledges 
limits on parents’ constitutional right to home school their children, but 
also because it approves of using schools to provide governmental 
officials access to children in a way that allows the government to protect 
the children from abuse and neglect.  This acknowledgment that home 
schooling can isolate children and hide evidence of abuse and the 
additional recognition that contact with people who have the ability and 
obligation to report signs of abuse or neglect is sometimes necessary 
even if it interferes with the privacy rights of the parents.  The case 
provides guidance and support for attempts to strike the proper balance 
between privacy rights of parents and the right of children to live free of 
abuse or neglect. 
2. Community Outreach and Education 
While there are many programs that provide assistance and support 
to victims of abuse (particularly women and children), people living in 
isolated communities may not have access to those programs or even 
know of their existence.  For example, those who grew up in polygamous 
communities may have such limited contact with the rest of society that 
they may not even be aware of their rights, much less how to enforce 
those rights.  Worse, law enforcement in some communities may be 
                                                     
 388. Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593. 
 389. Id. at 576 n.2 (teachers and teacher’s aides in public and private schools are required by law 
to report suspected child abuse or neglect). 
 390. Id. at 594. 
 391. Id.  The court was careful to note that the children in that case had already been declared 
dependent because of the abuse of their siblings.  Id. at 593–94.  “We are therefore not concerned 
with the interference with the rights of a fit parent; the parents in dependency have been judicially 
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sympathetic to or active participants in the oppressive culture.  Programs 
addressing the specific needs of individuals in those isolated 
communities must be developed and supported. 
The Arizona and Utah Attorneys General created one program—the 
Safety Net Program—in 2003.392  The Utah Legislature funded the 
Program, and the money was used to create a non-profit family support 
center for members of Utah’s polygamous communities suffering from 
abuse.393  The Program coordinates resources to help victims of child 
abuse and domestic violence and holds monthly meetings for 
representatives from law enforcement, state and local social service 
agencies, advocacy groups, and members of the community.394  The 
Program created the Safety Net Directory, a list of government agencies, 
social service providers, and non-profit organizations that provide law 
enforcement or social services in the area.395  The Program also created a 
manual that provides basic information about polygamous communities 
to assist human services professionals, law enforcement officers, and 
others in helping victims from these communities.396  Texas is also 
currently considering implementing a Safety Net Program.397 
While the Program provides much needed resources, it may not 
reach victims inside of isolated communities.  Those who are not allowed 
to venture outside of their community alone or who are monitored 
closely by those who seek to keep them isolated and oppressed may not 
know that help is available or may not have any way of reaching out to 
access that help.  To that end, widespread advertising, including on 
television, radio, and the Internet may reach the widest possible 
audience, although even those efforts will be futile if access to outside 
news and information is restricted or prohibited. 
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3. Enforcing Laws Mandating Registration of Birth and Identification 
of Parents 
Government should enforce laws making it a crime to fail to register 
or to lie about parental identity.  This will enable law enforcement to 
track children who do not attend public schools or otherwise participate 
in society.  If authorities do not know that such children exist, they 
cannot enforce rules such as those regulating vaccination and education.  
If abuse is alleged, it can avoid the situation that existed in the YFZ case 
in which authorities could not even identify children or their parents for 
purposes of evaluating the abuse allegations. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
The right to make certain decisions regarding our bodies, our 
families, and our religious practices is an essential part of our identity as 
Americans.  The right of privacy in these very personal areas will not be 
abridged without a fight and should not be abridged except in the most 
extraordinary circumstances.  However, the right to privacy cannot be 
used to shield abusers and other oppressors from liability or punishment.  
Nor should privacy laws prevent victims from seeking or obtaining the 
help they need or the enjoyment of rights they are guaranteed under the 
law.  Government, including legislators and courts, should find ways to 
balance the privacy rights of all with the need to protect those who are 
oppressed.  It may not be possible to save everyone, but the attempt must 
be made, because it is possible to save some. 
